Structural Racism and Multiracial Coalition Building

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report attempts to better understand how multiracial coalitions may be formed, how they are able to work effectively and what is needed to nurture and support them. By examining the existing literature on multiracial coalitions and then examining three existing case studies of successful multi-racial policy reform work in three very different contexts, the report draws some preliminary conclusions about ingredients necessary for multiracial coalitions to form and produce policy reforms that begin to dismantle structural racism.

Background and Literature Review

We begin with the assumption that structural racism both causes and foments racial and ethnic tensions between groups. Racial and ethnic tensions themselves then are not the important underlying barrier to multiracial work. Rather, it is the structural nature of race privileging that is the problem, both in terms of the conditions they produce for people of color in this country and in terms of collaborative efforts to solve problems in communities of color. Therefore, the report first defines and examines institutional racism. Briefly, it is defined as a set of historical factors, which have created a distributive system determining the possibilities and constraints within which, people of color are forced to act. It does not require that laws and institutions act in explicitly racist ways in order to exclude and constrain communities of color. They only need to perpetuate unequal historic conditions.

Examples of the present day impact of historic policies and practices that remain operational include ghettos, which were constructed and are perpetuated through governmental housing policies, institutional practices and private behaviors such as zoning regulations, discrimination in lending, and restrictive covenants. This segregation has itself become a self-perpetuating mechanism of racial isolation and structural poverty. Employment opportunities, income levels, and informal social networks are limited in ghettos. Educational inequities are exacerbated by this segregation and the localized financing structure of public education.

Moreover, this ghettoization, or concentration of poverty, grew dramatically between 1970 and 1990 and disproportionately affects people of color. This level of neighborhood poverty functions differently and much more destructively than individual poverty – and results in a multi-faceted disenfranchisement of entire communities.

Having reviewed the definition and nature of structural racism, the report reviews the literature relevant to multiracial coalitions. In sum, the literature often assumes that multiracial coalitions are necessary to achieve meaningful policy reforms to benefit minorities. It, at times, debates the necessity of premising coaltional analysis on class, usually dependent on views of incorporation of low income whites into coalitions with low income people of color. It also, increasingly argues for a framework for understanding racial hierarchy within the context of a multiracial society with many different oppressed non-white, ethnic minorities whose histories and experiences and
culture in the United States vary. Some of the literature examines race as a social construct and debates the continued importance of the traditional Black/White paradigm, sometimes reconceptualized in the literature. It also examines the dynamics in and successes and failures of particular urban coalitional experiences, mostly focused on electoral coalitions, and the particular factors seen as relevant to the formation of such coalitions.

The report finds that the most important shortcoming of much of the work in this area is that there has simply not been enough of it. Much of the literature is focused exclusively on electoral politics. Without examining other forms of coalitional work that may be outside of the formal electoral arena or not directly focused on electoral politics, this work may miss important coalitional forms and strategies that may provide more meaningful support for electoral coalitions or which can themselves be significant in impacting particular forms of structural racism. Furthermore, many of the case studies only examine structural arrangements that directly produce electoral tensions and/or joint work. Very few identify structural arrangements that produce broader racial and ethnic tensions. Also they often omit any discussion of coalition structure, formation, and operating processes, failing to take account of the different types of coalition work that exist and the factors which produce different functional choices.

There is, of course, useful literature. Perhaps what is most important about this body of work is the fact of its existence, which suggests a need for a paradigm shift in both defining oppression across racial groups and in identifying the policy reforms that must occur to create a paradigmatic shift in structural arrangements that support and reinforce racial stratification. The literature often identifies case studies that support opposing arguments about framing the issues in terms of race and/or class and debating limits and important conceptual components to the “Black/white paradigm.”

The report then describes attempts to define different coalitional formations. Political scientists often define electoral coalitions as short or long-term and as having a limited common strategic interest or shared ideologies. Gary Delgado, of the Applied Research Center, however, has more fully defined six coalitional forms, including: 1) Single-Issue Mobilizations (SIMs), often of individuals; 2) Grassroots Multiracial Organizations, which are community organizations with individual constituent members of different races; 3) Electoral Alliances, which are short-term efforts to get a candidate elected to office; 4) Multiracial Issue-Based Coalitions focused on the creation or alteration of a public policy, but with varied structures; 5) Multiracial Networks, which are permanent; and 6) Multiethnic Organizations: single organizations which organize and work with different ethnic communities in the same pan-ethnic category (e.g., Asian Americans or Latinos).

An examination of the structural arrangements identified in the literature as producing inter-group tensions, include a range of perceptions about how a racial or ethnic group benefits from the racial hierarchy created through the structure of civil rights laws, remedies (e.g., who benefits from affirmative action) or social stratification based on stereotyping (e.g., Asians as model minorities). Demographic changes, specifically
the growing number of Latino and Asian immigrants in urban centers, are often identified in the literature as producing tensions between immigrant communities and African Americans and whites. These shifts are linked to fundamental changes in the economy coupled with limited public resources increasing competition between ethnic groups for public and private resources.

Some of the literature examines racial attitudes and identity formation in support of policy reforms or coalitional opportunities and challenges. Importantly, the literature identifies the complexity of racial identification as dependent on individual and contextual characteristics of the community. This research suggests that the fluid nature of identity formation and the multiple identities people carry mean that coalitional opportunities will vary depending on the context and issues identified for coalitional work, as well as the ideology of the coalition, if any.

Case Studies

The report identified three case studies of successful multiracial coalitions for examination: 1) the Community Alliance for the Environment (CAFE), a New York City neighborhood-based coalition of Latino, African American and Hasidic Jewish organizations working on environmental justice issues; 2) The Los Angeles Metropolitan Alliance (Met Alliance), a city-wide coalition of African American, Latino and Asian organizations and individuals working on job training and creation; and 3) Concerned Citizens for Children with Special Needs in Education (CCQSEP), a Mississippi-based state-wide informal coalition of Mississippi Delta based African American activist community organizations and predominantly white, state-wide disability rights groups working on educational opportunities for disabled children. These coalitions were defined as successful because they met the following criteria: they established a racially/ethnically diverse constituency; garnered significant political attention; sustained political cooperation; and; won an important reform victory or sustained continuing collective work on structural reforms that could impact low-income communities of color.

In an effort to better understand the impact of context on coalitional forms and strategic decision-making, the report examines successful multiracial coalitions working on different issues, having different coalitional structures and which were located in different regions of the country. Each case study extensively reports on the historic context within which the coalitions are operating, identifying the structural racism, which has produced historic tensions between the groups, and the structure and processes developed for each coalition in light of these factors.
Report Findings and Recommendations

As a result of these three case studies, the report concludes that:

- Structural arrangements produce racial and ethnic tensions, but that specific local and regional contexts impact the formation, structure and strategies of multiracial coalitions.

- Two factors critical at the outset for the formation of multiracial coalitions across the three case studies include: 1) leader(s) with a vision for multiracial work and a strategic sense of how to foment it in light of the context within which the work is to occur; and 2) long-standing, respected institutions in communities of color with real constituencies.

- Coalitions are not static in membership or level of participation. Nor are they static in form, purpose or goals. The strength of the coalitions lay, to some degree, in their mutability.

- Research and access to information to make policy reform arguments were important to all three case study coalitions.

- All three coalitions have forces within the coalitions pressing the coalitions in new directions. Therefore, an important benefit to the coalitions themselves, outside of their policy reform impact, is their ability to channel cross racial and ethnic dialogue on issues not necessarily taken up by the coalition.

  The report makes several recommendations. It recommends that foundations identify visionary leaders with real constituencies and to support the existence and strengthening of community of color organizations in order to support the development of multiracial coalitions. It also recommends the support of research on structural racism generally, data collection relevant to particular contexts specifically and technical assistance to support multiracial coalitions which aim to dismantle structural arrangements which cause inequity and racial and ethnic tensions. It finally suggests training usages for the two main sections of the report, the literature review and the case study sections.
I. STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS:

Structural arrangements produce tensions between racial and ethnic groups. One question this report examines is the impact of structural arrangements on the formation of multiracial coalitions. Therefore, it is important to first discuss what we mean by structural racism and its various iterations: spatial, institutional and systemic racism. In examining three cases, we found that the Williamsburg/Greenpoint neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York, the structurally produced racial and ethnic tensions include limited affordable housing and economic growth, environmental degradation, and racially biased police treatment. In Los Angeles, the structurally produced tensions include segregation and lack of educational and employment opportunities. And in Mississippi, the structurally produced tensions include segregation and lack of educational opportunities as well as rural poverty and lack of structures impacting representation of the Delta region. What is structural racism and how does it result in and perpetuate these tension-creating barriers to equal life opportunities?

Racial disparities persist in our country, and racial and ethnic hierarchies cross a number of indicators. For example, according to the Lewis Mumford Center, the mean incomes of Blacks and Hispanics are between $15,000-$18,000 less than Whites. And while only 9.1 percent of Whites live below the poverty line, 24.9 percent of Blacks and 22.6 percent of Latinos do. Such disparities may only worsen given the current economic and political climate, and the rapid demographic changes occurring across the country. With regard to demographic changes – specifically the increasing number of non-White immigrants – some have predicted that the coming “majority minority” population will create more meaningful social, political and economic inclusion of non-Whites. But as the following discussion will show, racial subordination will continue without changes in the policies and practices that cause it. It is also important to recognize that disparities exist on many levels: individual, group, neighborhood, city, and nation. In order to account for these disparities and hierarchies, we must identify and make transparent the structural racism that underlies them.

According to Richard Thompson Ford, describing racism as structural recognizes that laws and institutions need not be explicitly racist in order to disempower communities of color; they need only perpetuate unequal historic conditions. He argues that,

“[r]ace-neutral policies, set against an historical backdrop of state action in the service of racial segregation and thus against a contemporary backdrop of racially identified space…predictably reproduce and entrench racial segregation and the racial-

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1 Lewis Mumford Center, Separate and Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks and Hispanics in Metropolitan American (2002).
3 See, e.g., Glen Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality 162 (2002) where he argues that we must look at external, civic and public structures that provide opportunity and reward or lack thereof.
caste system that accompanies it. Thus, the persistence of racial segregation, even in the face of civil rights reform, is not mysterious.\textsuperscript{5}

Taylor and Cole define structural as:

A distributive system that determines the possibilities and constraints within which people of color are forced to act. The system involves the operation of racialized structural relationships that produce the unequal distribution of material resources, such as jobs, income, housing, neighborhood conditions, and access to opportunities...such as education and training.\textsuperscript{6}

John A. Powell argues, however, that we cannot simply talk about racial disparities as failures of distribution. Rather, we must look at the factors out of which disparities arise. As Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton argue in their seminal book, American Apartheid, the racial and ethnic ghettos did not come about by accident. They were constructed and are perpetuated through governmental housing policies, institutional practices and private behaviors such as zoning regulations, discrimination in lending, and restrictive covenants. Contrary to public perception, the elimination of many overtly racist policies and practices has not eliminated the segregation itself. This segregation has itself become a self-perpetuating mechanism of racial isolation and structural poverty. For example, because education is funded largely through local taxes, high poverty areas offer significantly limited educational opportunities.

Educational disadvantage is also closely linked to poverty, both poverty of the individual student, and of the school he or she attends.\textsuperscript{7} Impoverished students do better if they live in middle-class neighborhoods or attend more affluent schools. Resource disparities also persist in public education, tracking this concentration of poverty.\textsuperscript{8} Racially segregated schools are more often twice as large as predominantly White schools, have 15 percent larger class sizes, rely upon less qualified, transitory teachers, have lower quality curricula, higher achievement gaps, rates of tardiness and unexcused absence, and lower rates of extracurricular involvement. Students in these neighborhoods also face family instability, and experience higher mobility and dropout rates.\textsuperscript{9}

Employment opportunities, income levels, and informal social networks are also limited. More specifically, jobs that previously attracted low income and immigrant workers have moved both outside of cities and outside the country. Most metropolitan areas experience what is called ‘spatial mismatch’ between the types of jobs available in

\textsuperscript{5} Id. at 1845.
\textsuperscript{6} Henry Louis Taylor, Jr. and Sam Cole, \textit{Structural Racism and Efforts to Radically Reconstruct the Inner-City Built Environment}, 43 Annual Conference, Associate of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Cleveland Ohio, November 8-11, 2001 at 5.
\textsuperscript{7} Gary Orfield, \textit{Schools More Separate: Consequence of a Decade of Re SEGREGATION} 39 (July 2001).
\textsuperscript{8} Stephen J. Schellenberg, Concentration of Poverty and the Ongoing Need for Title I, in \textit{HARD WORK FOR GOOD SCHOOLS: FACTS NOT FADS IN TITLE I REFORM}, 130, 137 (Gary Orfield & Elizabeth H. DeBray eds., 1999).
the city and those for which urban residents qualify. The jobs that do exist are often part-time and offer few benefits or potential for upward mobility; the better jobs are in the suburbs making it difficult for low-income inner city residents without a car to reach. Low paying jobs have also been shipped overseas where it is more profitable for businesses to pay foreign workers lower wages. And businesses that do remain in neighborhoods of color often tend to keep residents impoverished (and unhealthy).

Home values are lower and the ability to move into stable areas is hindered by lack of accumulated assets. The per capita wealth differential between Blacks and Whites is 1 to 11, with the net worth of Blacks, measured in terms of home equity and financial assets, remaining at more than $40,000 less than that of Whites.\(^\text{10}\)

In fact, although there was a slight slowing shown in the 2000 census, the nation has experienced a two-fold increase in communities of concentrated poverty over the last several decades,\(^\text{11}\) primarily in our racially segregated communities of color. The federal government defines concentrated poverty as a census tract with 40 percent or more of its residents living below poverty level. As of 1990, close to 3,417 of the nation's 45,000 census tracks experienced concentrated poverty compared with only 1400 of them in 1970.\(^\text{12}\) In terms of numbers, this represents more than 10.4 million people.\(^\text{13}\) It is important to note that research clearly demonstrates that this level of neighborhood poverty functions differently and much more destructively than individual poverty – and results in a multi-faceted disenfranchisement of entire communities.

This concentration of poverty has disproportionately affected persons of color. Of those living in concentrated poverty, one-half are Black, and one-fourth is Hispanic.\(^\text{14}\) In fact, 30 percent of Blacks below the poverty line lived in high poverty tracts in 1990.\(^\text{15}\) William Julius Wilson refers to these urban poor as the “underclass,” whose primary problem is “joblessness reinforced by an increasing social isolation in an impoverished neighborhood.”\(^\text{16}\) This problem is not one of genetic differences, as was argued in the early 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, or one of culture, as was argued in the late 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, but of isolation from community and other necessary resources.\(^\text{17}\) This problem is a symptom of structural racism. As Glen Loury puts it, “although the extent of overt racial

\(^{10}\) Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality 33-35, 1995.

\(^{11}\) Id. Jargowsky also acknowledges that the number of high poverty residents has dropped from about 10.4 million in 1990 to 7.9 million in 2000.


\(^{13}\) Id. Jargowsky also acknowledges that the number of high poverty residents has dropped from about 10.4 million in 1990 to 7.9 million in 2000.

\(^{14}\) Paul Jargowski, Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s, 13 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 288 (1994).


\(^{17}\) William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged 60 (1987).
discrimination against Blacks has obviously declined over the last half-century, it seems to me equally obvious that racial injustice in U.S. social, economic, and political life persists, though less transparently so, and in ways that are more difficult to root out.\textsuperscript{18}

Suburban sprawl and metropolitan fragmentation exacerbate segregation and concentrated poverty and are perhaps the greatest obstacles to achieving a more inclusive democracy today. As people and businesses with the economic means sprawl away from central cities ("White flight"), they settle into developing suburban jurisdictions. They leave behind low-income minorities in high-need, resource-depleted central cities and inner-ring suburbs, creating fragmented metropolitan regions with enormous inequities between central cities and developing suburbs. Physical barriers such as freeways literally keep inner city ghettos walled off from the rest of the metropolitan area. Few Whites move into these unstable areas, which are also burdened, by inferior public services, higher crime, toxicity, and deterioration. If they do move in, the process of gentrification often displaces low-income persons of color. This form of structural racism is referred to by Cardinal George of the Catholic archdiocese as spatial racism:

\textit{“Spatial racism refers to patterns of metropolitan development in which some affluent Whites create racially and economically segregated suburbs or gentrified areas of cities, leaving the poor -- mainly African Americans, Hispanics and some newly arrived immigrants -- isolated in deteriorating areas of the cities and older suburbs.”}\textsuperscript{19}

The effects of structural racism are manifest across various systems in what is sometimes called systemic racism, including education (through standardized testing, discipline and expulsion rates, per pupil expenditures and tracking), housing (through affordability, availability, homeownership rates, discrimination in lending) and criminal justice (through the “war on drugs,” racial profiling, access to adequate legal representation, sentencing disparities, and disparate incarceration rates).\textsuperscript{20}

Systemic racism has also impacted minority political “voice,” rendering transformation of decision-making structures difficult. Certainly persistent economic inequality negatively impacts political participation. More than 2/3 of people in the U.S. with incomes greater than $50,000 vote compared with 1/3 of those with incomes under $10,000.\textsuperscript{21} This differential turnout is far greater than that in Europe. Worse yet, most states disenfranchise convicted felons either temporarily or permanently. And disenfranchise also disproportionately affects non-felons of color.

\textsuperscript{18} See, LOURY, supra note 3, at 20.
\textsuperscript{19} Francis Cardinal George, O.M.I. Dwell in My Love: A Pastoral Letter on Racism 10 (2002).
\textsuperscript{21} U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2000 (P20-542) (2002) Table B.
Political fragmentation and urban sprawl also limit participation and are particularly harmful. Persons of color, concentrated in pockets of poverty within a fragmented metropolitan region, do not have the resources to build the political clout necessary to participate meaningfully in the democratic process. Voting is made even more inaccessible for these communities when incumbents with little interest in politicizing them make decisions about elections including polling locations, times, and staffing.

Our current political system perpetuates this disenfranchisement. Almost all major elections in the United States are based on the "first-past-post," "winner-takes-all" principles. Voters for the candidate who receives the most votes win representation. Voters for the other candidates win nothing. This system precludes minorities from being represented and undermines the concept of fair representation. It also distorts democracy by allowing a single group to monopolize power.

It is this invisible ability of structural racism to maintain White supremacy that is so problematic. This invisibility takes on a most pernicious form in the “colorblind” position, which claims that all persons should be treated equally without reference to context, history, or culture.

The “colorblind” position erases race from the analysis by claiming that racism is a thing of the past -- racial inequality is natural, or caused by legitimate, “neutral” forces. White privilege is completely ignored and a sense of moral innocence prevails. Furthermore, the “colorblind” position fosters a collective ignorance of and undermines attempts at eradicating persistent racial disparities – which are widening in nearly every social and economic indicator. Instead, racially charged explanations for these disparities, such as the existence of a “culture of poverty,” or the unwillingness of Blacks to pull their own weight persist.

The “colorblind” position also focuses too heavily on intentional discrimination rather than structural racism.22 Perhaps this “colorblindness” or invisibility is due to what Manning Marable locates in structural racism: an all-encompassing worldview, a way of interpreting and understanding phenomena. In our democracy there exists “a type of social negation, where Whites can only exist as ‘Whites’ when a group is relegated to the inferior status of being non-White….the entire logic of racism points toward the inevitability of conflict between racial groups and the ultimate inability to negotiate a long-term agreement with the racialized Other.”23

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22 For example, The Supreme Court recently ruled in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 274 (2001), that private suits under Title VI – a provision prohibiting discrimination by recipients of federal funding – can now be brought only for intentional discrimination. If plaintiffs cannot prove intentional discrimination, they can no longer sue under Title VI, even if they can prove that the challenged action has a discriminatory impact for which no justification can be shown. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoval abruptly reverses nearly three decades of precedent, including the unanimous views of all nine federal appeals courts.

Although Marable and others believe that structural racism is the fundamental problem for the viability of American democracy, many still believe that a multiracial democracy can be achieved. Marable and others believe fundamental change within our system will have to occur, not from the top down, but from the bottom up. The types of coalitions this project surveys mirror the aspirational and motivational goals of the “political race” project described by Guinier and Torres, the goal of which is to rebuild a social movement with the ability to refashion our democracy.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW ON MULTIRACIAL COALITIONS:

To determine how to build sustainable multiracial coalitions to achieve the structural and institutional transformations necessary for a just and equitable society, there is much we can learn from the existing literature. Some important questions, however, remain insufficiently examined.

The literature often assumes that multiracial coalitions are necessary to achieve meaningful policy reforms to benefit minorities. It, at times, debates the necessity of premising coalitional analysis on class, usually premised on the importance of incorporating low income Whites into coalitions with low income non-Whites. It also, increasingly argues for a framework for understanding racial hierarchy within the context of a multiracial society with many different oppressed non-White, ethnic minorities whose histories and experiences and culture in the United States vary. Some of the literature examines race as a social construct and debates the continued importance of the traditional Black/White paradigm, sometimes reconceptualized in the literature. It also examines the dynamics in and successes and failures of particular urban coalitional experiences, mostly focused on electoral coalitions, and the particular factors seen as relevant to the formation of such coalitions. These factors include: demographics; racial identity formation and stereotypes; and, resource competition. Much of this literature assumes the necessity of identified “common interests” or shared goals across racial and ethnic groups to the formation of multiracial coalitions.

Below are broad observations about the type of scholarship that exists on multiracial coalitions, descriptions of some important information not provided by the existing research, and a review of useful and important literature on the topic. Intellectual examinations of multiracial coalitions fall within two general categories:

1. Conceptual and policy paradigms necessary for the creation and support of multiracial work;
2. The ingredients required to do multi-racial work.

The most important shortcoming of much of the work in this area is that there has simply not been enough of it. Much of the literature is focused exclusively on electoral politics. This literature helpfully identifies and describes important structural tensions, at

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24 Id. at 23.
25 Id. at xiv.
least as produced by or influencing mechanisms of electoral politics themselves. This body of scholarship, however, often assumes the importance of electoral politics as a strategic end in itself or it assumes that electoral politics is the primary strategy to policy reform. Without examining other forms of coalitional work that may be outside of the formal electoral arena or not directly focused on electoral politics, the literature appears to miss important coalitional forms and strategies that may provide more meaningful support for electoral coalitions or which can themselves be significant in impacting particular forms of structural racism.

Furthermore, many of these studies do not take account of non-electoral structural arrangements that produce tensions and/or joint work (e.g., education, private sector economic shifts, etc.). They often omit discussion of coalition structure, formation, and operating processes, failing to take account of the different types of coalition work that exists and the factors that produce different functional choices. As Gary Delgado states in a recent report prepared for the Annie E. Casey Foundation: “Not only does the literature fail to examine models outside of [either the interest or issue-based] framework, most of the studies focus on only one effort, thereby missing the potential for a comparative analysis of which internal organizational and leadership structures are most effective in different political climates, or how geographic locations, demographic settings, and funding environments intersect with the pursuit of different issues or agendas.”

Finally, there is also little analysis of the strategies developed and used by multiracial coalitions and the efficacy of those strategies in achieving structural reforms.

Outside of the electoral context, the literature on multiracial coalitions more often focuses on multi-racial organizing, important coalitional work in its own right which may also advance other coalitional efforts. What little is published on multiracial organizing describes how it has been done and defines success as the participation of people across races and ethnicities. It offers little analysis, however, of the effectiveness or likely effectiveness of such organizing on dismantling structural racism. Successful inclusion of individuals of different races and ethnicities in policy reform efforts is important and may even be a key component to achieving policy reform goals. Yet, the literature does not necessarily demonstrate this point or examine their impact on structural problems. Nor does it tell us if and when there are other key activities or structures that must exist to further reform goals.

Having identified what is missing from much of the scholarly writing on multiracial coalitions, the following discussion identifies what can be drawn from this work. Many scholars point to conceptual challenges or barriers to building meaningful multiracial coalitions. Perhaps what is most important about this body of work is the fact of its existence. Its existence demonstrates a need for a paradigm shift in both defining oppression across racial groups and in identifying the policy reforms that must occur to create a paradigmatic shift in structural arrangements that support and reinforce racial stratification.

A. Race, Class and the Black/White Paradigm

Some of the literature implicates strategic decisions about the way that racial or class paradigms advance or hinder coalitional work. It implicates the intersection of race and class in America and debates the question of the primacy of racism versus classism, or some understanding of the relationship between the two, as the primary engine of oppression for poor people of color. The race versus class debate concerns implicit or explicit strategic arguments about the importance of or methodology for the promotion of coalitions between low income people of color and Whites. This literature is also concerned with coalitions between non-White ethnic groups, which implicate the “Black/White Paradigm” – the discourse of racial privilege and institutional arrangements along Black/White historic and relational lines, rather than recognizing the experiences of all groups of color who experience marginalization.

William Julius Wilson argues that too much emphasis is placed on racial divisions when studies show that different ethnic groups share many concerns.27 His argument is predicated on the urgency of a coalition, whose agenda can galvanize large segments of the population.28 The coalition’s mission necessarily must demonstrate how the coalition’s accomplishments will benefit all groups at the bottom of the economic scale, “not just poor minorities.”29 He cites survey and case study data that show a destabilization of multiracial coalitions focused on racial or ethnic equality and the increase in persistence and success of multiracial coalitions that focus on race neutral issues.30

Focusing purely on economics, James Jennings identifies the challenge of developing a shared policy paradigm across ethnic groups that both identifies and responds to the common interests of all groups.31 He has pointed to the dominant liberal and conservative policy paradigms, which he refers to as “Yankee Capitalism” and “Cowboy Capitalism,” respectively, both of which serve to protect the interests of those groups with power and wealth. They both seek to attract businesses downtown, attract the middle classes back to cities, and to identify services for budget cuts to reduce fiscal pressures on those with major capital or financial investments. He poses the challenge as developing a populist policy paradigm for “Economic Democracy,” which some have

27 See, William Julius Wilson, Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics, 568 Annals Am. Academy Pol. & Soc. Sci., at 78 (Mar. 2000); William Julius Wilson, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL DIVIDE; RISING INEQUALITY AND COALITION POLITICS (1999) at 92. Wilson refers to an analysis of responses to National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Surveys since 1982, which showed racial groups mostly agreed on the same core values and had similar perceptions regarding socioeconomic problems. Id. at 92-93 Wilson also observed a convergence of views on policy issues, with the exception of affirmative action and abortion.
28 THE BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL DIVIDE; RISING INEQUALITY AND COALITION POLITICS at 80. He mentions and describes grassroots coalitions, but his orientation descriptively as to issues is national policy (welfare, globalization-related, affirmative action).
29 Id. at 91.
30 Id. at 92.
suggested includes constraining the mobility of multinational corporations, regulating plant closings, using eminent domain to take private property for public use, etc.

Manning Marable, argues for a definition of race that recognizes class oppression. He points to the challenge of de-linking national identity from the structure of White, upper class, male privilege against which race has been defined. He decries racial identity politics, stating that, “utilizing the unifying discourse of race” obscures class stratification even within a racial group. Marable does not argue for the discursive exclusion of race altogether. Rather, he argues that race alone cannot serve as the sole explanation for any one racial group’s woes and only limits the capacity for coalition building between communities of color. He states that the current social and economic status quo does not encourage coalition-building among the “have-nots of society.”

Marable defines racism as

“an unequal relationship between social aggregates, characterized by dominant and subordinate forms of social interaction and reinforced by the intricate patterns of public discourse, power, ownership, and privilege within the economic, social and political institutions of society.”

Iris Young disputes the notion that the only way to large-scale, transformative racial justice is via the “universal working class.” She argues that different identities are associated with unique oppressions, despite the potential for commonalities across identities (e.g., gender, or race). Young asserts that today politics of identity is a misnomer. What people call “identity politics” in the current atmosphere is over-inclusive, sweeping in any type of race-conscious organizing, as opposed to merely evoking the old-fashioned identity politics of cold competition for limited resources. She argues, “Group-specific political tendencies draw less rigid boundaries around themselves than they did twenty years ago, and recognize a wider range of internal differences.”

Guinier and Torres believe that framing issues through the lens of the experiences of people of color is essential to the sweeping social change that would benefit all disadvantaged social groups and galvanize collective action by helping individuals connect their experiences to those of others. Contrary to the strategic tact Wilson insists on, Guinier and Torres, advocate for enlisting race for democratic reform, not organizing around race as an identity. They describe this use of race as political race, which is not driven by physical or cultural identity but is concerned with the distribution of social goods.

It is notable that all of the scholars engaged in the debate around the strategic strengths of a race, class, or universal frame are able to cite specific case studies to

32 Supra note 23.
33 Iris Marion Young, The Complexities of Coalition, DISSERT, Winter 1997, p. 64-70. at 66.
support their varying arguments. Wilson, for example, points to the organizing efforts of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) in Texas. A multiracial (Latino, African American and White), faith-based coalition of churches, IAF explicitly rejects race-defined issues because of the risk of fragmenting or marginalizing particular groups within its membership.  

IAF’s coalition of churches and their members is predicated on a shared identity as religious actor with the support of “visionary community leaders who have been able to explain the merits of such a strategy to their constituents.” Importantly, Wilson distinguishes between the strategic effectiveness of non-racial issue framing at the local level and its effectiveness at the national level. He questions whether, for example, African Americans would join a coalition unwilling to recognize affirmative action as a crucial national policy for advancing equality.

Guinier and Torres also use a local case study from Greensboro, North Carolina to advance their argument on the strategic importance of having a “political race” frame. In that case study, a group of African American ministers helped to organize the larger community to support a wage struggle between a local K-Mart store and its majority African American staff. The staff of the particular store was 65% African American. K-Mart paid a substantially lower hourly wage to its workers at that particular store than it did to its employees in predominantly White stores in predominantly White localities. Since there are strong anti-union sentiments in the state as a whole, the ministers framed the issue as both a civil rights issue and an issue about the general welfare of the larger community. White workers eventually became part of the struggle and even identified and protested against the police’s discriminatory treatment of African American protesters.

The arguments made by Wilson and Guinier and Torres appear oppositional to the extent that they draw very different conclusions about the importance and efficacy of race-explicit issue framing as it relates to fomenting and sustaining local multiracial coalitions. These arguments, however, might not appear as oppositional if we examined more closely, the context, coalitional structure, and goals of the coalitional efforts, as well as the structural impact of their respective successes. One might find important strengths and weaknesses in both models.

The literature that debates the “Black/White paradigm” does so because of an implicit or explicit view that the descriptive language we use to discuss race impacts the tensions extant between racially marginalized communities. Given the tensions between communities of color, much of the literature challenges the use of the Black/White paradigm. Blackwell, Kwoh, and Pastor argue that the Black/White paradigm can obscure the factors that distinguish Latino from African American poverty and the unique aspects of the Asian American experience. Juan Perea argues that the “Black/White paradigm” does so because of an implicit or explicit view that the descriptive language we use to discuss race impacts the tensions extant between racially marginalized communities. Given the tensions between communities of color, much of the literature challenges the use of the Black/White paradigm. Blackwell, Kwoh, and Pastor argue that the Black/White paradigm can obscure the factors that distinguish Latino from African American poverty and the unique aspects of the Asian American experience.

See Wilson, BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL DIVIDE, supra note 27, at 87-88.

Id.

Binary Paradigm” excludes Latino struggles “from the narrative of civil rights history” and thereby further marginalizes non-Black people of color.\(^{38}\) Hochschild and Rogers argue that the paradigm overemphasizes discrimination and obscures policy and other issues that African Americans may hold in common with other racial minority groups.\(^{39}\) These arguments imply the importance of identifying shared interests and recognizing unique experiences in order to build multiracial coalitions.

Hochschild and Rogers also argue that the paradigm assumes a level of unity in the Black community that may not exist, and precludes potential alliances with other groups by overemphasizing relationships between Black and White political actors. Eric Yamamoto suggests that the Black/White paradigm is insufficient to deal with issues of non-White racial conflict, because it focuses “on how these group interests and cultural patterns are situated in and determined by a predominantly white-constructed socio-economic structure . . . present[ing] whiteness as the singular agent of nonwhite conflict, leaving non-white racial communities free of agency – and responsibility.”\(^{40}\)

Some of the literature reflects the critique of the Black/White paradigm, but makes arguments about its usefulness and ways to clarify it to account for racial hierarchy more broadly. Taunya Lovell Banks states that as a binary lens, the Black/White paradigm is “an imperfect analytical tool.”\(^{41}\) Nonetheless, she cautions against abandoning it because it “helps explain how and why non-White groups like Asians occupy the middle racial position in the United States,” and it “helps explain inter-group tensions between Blacks and Asians.”\(^{42}\) Banks describes how Asians and Asian Indians in Mississippi consciously occupied the middle in a Black/White hierarchy, not allowed to share the position of Whites but not wishing to be denigrated to the bottom social


\(^{40}\) ERIC YAMAMOTO, *INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA* (1999) at 70.


\(^{42}\) Id. at 39.
position of Blacks.\textsuperscript{43} She further discusses how conscious positioning and continued White appeasement can preclude opportunities for coalition building among racial minorities.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{B. Coalitional Structures}

Much of the race versus class and Black/White paradigm debate in the literature searches for conceptual frameworks that more fully describe structural hierarchies and elevate common interests among different ethnic groups. What implications do these debates have for the form and structure of multiracial coalitions? As stated previously, most of the research and writing on multi-racial coalitions has focused on coalitions formed for the purpose of impacting electoral politics. Some political scientists have pointed out that there has not traditionally been a conceptually precise definition of political coalitions.

Some political scientists have distinguished, for example, between alliances and coalitions, stating that alliances are long-term and based on common interests and principles. Coalitions are defined as short-term and focused on specific objectives. Watts distinguishes between two very different types of political coalitions without distinguishing them as “alliances” or “coalitions.”\textsuperscript{47}

“Disjointed Coalitions” are strategic coalitions in which participating groups have a shared goal that is important for each to realize more specific, divergent goals. Electoral coalitions focused on electing a particular individual to office are commonly

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Id.} at 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.} at 11, 31-33, 36.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
disjointed coalitions. The coalition partners want the individual elected for different reasons and may be at odds again after the election.

“Shared Core Coalitions” are issue driven coalitions that bring groups in by virtue of their mutual support of a common issue. Participants must let go of or subordinate key aspects of their specific agendas to work on the universally shared agenda. The civil rights and anti-war movements are examples of shared core coalitions.

While some political scientists have assumed that shared racial minority group status generates shared interests and, therefore, momentum towards multiracial political coalition among different ethnic groups (assuming mutual respect and shared interests and political goals), others have pointed to metropolitan examples that demonstrate that the picture is much more complicated. Sonenshein argues that multiracial coalitions are often based on shared ideology more so than common interests. Proponents of the “shared ideology” theory suggest that groups with shared ideologies will prefer coalitional relationships with one another over relationships with groups having different ideologies but with whom they share a strategic interest. Sonenshein actually adds more nuanced observations to the discussion. He suggests that neither “shared ideology” nor “shared interests” fully explains these coalitions, although he finds shared ideology to be a stronger unifier in political coalitions. He also points to the importance of leadership and the extent to which there are trusting relationships between leaders. Leadership relationships are important because “[l]eaders and organizers have an impact on how group interests are perceived.” He suggests that it may be easier for leaders to overcome interest conflicts among allies with shared ideologies.

Delgado identifies six different forms of multi-ethnic coalitions that include, singly or in combination, components of all of the above definitions and forces of coalitional formation:

1. Single-Issue Mobilizations (SIMs): alliances, which often begin as ad-hoc, mono-racial responses to specific incidents. The groups are composed of individuals, but they usually do not have formal membership structures. Common issues that SIMs address include police or INS violence against a person of color, employment discrimination, mistreatment or miseducation of young people in school, etc.

2. Grassroots Multiracial Organizations: community organization with individual constituent members of different races. Some of these organizations are neighborhood based, with constituents recruited from multiracial neighborhoods. Other formations are intentionally multiracial. These might be focused on an issue or a set of political principles. Multiracial organizations are not necessarily multicultural.

3. Electoral Alliances: short-term, opportunistic efforts are built solely for the achievement of one objective—the election of a specific candidate.

49 Id.
4. MultiRacial Issue-based Coalitions: focused on the creation or alteration of a public policy, but structures vary. Some are leadership based, formed by the recruitment of the elite leadership of established organizations. Others are formed by obtaining formal buy-in or endorsement from member organizations. Still others combine key leader selection with organizational recruitment and the participation of unaffiliated individuals.

5. Multiracial Networks: permanent formations organized to achieve specific political goals on a level that the individual organizations cannot attain. What differentiates these networks from multiracial coalitions is their commitment to mutual assistance and in some instances a collective analytical framework for the groups involved, as well as access to national resources.

6. Multiethnic organizations: single organizations that organize and work with different ethnic communities.50

Because much of the literature is imprecise or ignores coalitional structure, it is silent on the impact these structures have on reform efforts.

C. Structural Barriers to Multiracial Coalition-Building

There are many manifestations of the tensions that exist between people of color communities. As powell points out, African Americans perceive Latinos and other racial minorities as benefiting from the civil rights movement, but in a way that harms African American opportunities.51 For example, the inclusion of racial/ethnic groups in affirmative action programs increases the number of minorities in leadership positions and reinforces the public’s view that these programs are no longer necessary, making them more difficult to sustain politically. African Americans see Latinos and Asians as beneficiaries of their civil rights struggles who then undermine their hard-won successes. On the other side, legal discrimination against Latinos and Asians is more difficult to prove based on current civil rights laws. Because Latino and Asian groups perceive some African Americans as using their political capital to exclude other minorities from civil rights remedies and other protections, they blame African Americans for their lack of civil rights protection.52

Also, communities of color may be angered by the perception of other minority groups as claiming or enjoying a degree of White privilege. For example, the dominant culture has bestowed a degree of White privilege on Asians due to their successful integration into White culture. Commonly referred to as the “model minority,” Asians’

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52 See Yamamoto, supra note 40, at 29.
perceived economic success and work ethic has been rewarded with social and economic privileges.\footnote{NEIL GOTANDA, MULTICULTURAL & RACIAL STRATIFICATION, IN MAPPING MULTICULTURALISM 243 (1996).}

Structural barriers to opportunity, such as the legal and remedial structure of civil rights laws and the way in which White racial privilege confers economic or political benefits on certain communities at certain times, without changing fundamental mechanisms of discrimination, produce these tensions. Many writers have identified these and other specific structural arrangements as barriers to effective multiracial coalitions.

1. Demographics

Scholars regularly cite changing demographics as a major cause of tension and conflict between racial and ethnic groups and, therefore, a challenge to multiracial coalition-building. What these writings often fail to analyze is why changing demographics create tension and conflict. That is, what are the structural arrangements that native born racial and ethnic groups inhabit, and that new immigrants enter, which pit them against one another? According to the 2000 census figures, more than ten percent of the population was immigrants, the highest proportion since the 1940s. In fact, almost half of US population growth is due to immigration.\footnote{Specifically, 38.3\% of the 1990 to 2000 population growth was due to increases in the immigrant population. LEWIS MUMFORD CENTER, AMERICA’S NEWCOMERS 4 (2003).} New immigrants are primarily concentrated in the urban areas. According to 2000 census, over 95 percent of the foreign-born population lived in metropolitan areas, compared with 77 percent of the native-born.\footnote{2000 U.S. Census.} According to Michael Jones Correa, there is a dearth of studies on how new immigrants have been incorporated into the American political system.\footnote{Michael Jones-Correa, Structural Shifts and Institutional Capacity: Possibilities for Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict in Urban Settings, in GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES 184 (MICHAEL JONES-CORREA ED., 2001).}

Jones-Correa argues that the fundamental economic changes” simultaneous with “severely strained public resources,”\footnote{Id. at 85.} has increased competition between ethnic groups for public and private resources.\footnote{Id.} Correa’s work is useful in that it contextualizes these demographic changes to understand their importance to multiracial political coalitions. He argues that a substantial number of new immigrants have arrived into multiethnic urban areas that are undergoing fundamental economic changes at the same time that public resources have become strained. These structural realities increase competition between ethnic groups for public and private resources, according to Correa. He finds that, while the general research consensus is that new immigrants do not compete for jobs, there is research that demonstrates job competition between ethnic groups at the lowest rungs of the wage ladder.\footnote{Id. at 188.} In particular, he notes African American job
displacement in Los Angeles and New York City. Correa adds, however, that the most contentious arena is the public sector where groups compete for political representation and public sector jobs. Competition is increased in the public sphere, because the public sector “depends on relatively fixed resources.”

2. Racial/Ethnic Identity

Some of the literature analyzes the prospects of multi-racial coalition-building based on racial identity formation and the impact of “racing” as it occurs in the US context. Scholars argue and studies suggest that racial identity is constructed and that it can shift. Young explains that although individuals make their own identities, this process occurs under imposed conditions. Bashi and McDaniel have stated that “[r]acial identification is a symbol of social status.” Bashi and McDaniel have stated that “[r]acial identification is a symbol of social status.” Forced to choose between White and Black, most Latin Americans choose White. Citing a national survey by De la Garza et al. of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Mexicans, Correa notes that few first-generation Latin American immigrants self-identify as Black; even those from countries that have a significant African heritage. For example, sixty-three percent of the Puerto Ricans surveyed identified as White, and 94 percent of the Cubans surveyed did. Correa attributes such self-identification to Latinos’ awareness of the social privileges or disadvantages associated with color.

Anecdotal accounts suggest that choosing to identify as Black, White, or other is related to perceived benefits and disadvantages associated with White versus Black. Delgado quotes Gwen Andrade, an African American political and community activist observing electoral politics in Providence, Rhode Island who suggests, “In America, the further away from ‘Black’ you get, the better.” She further notes that instead of working together against the established and corrupt White power structure, Latinos and Blacks in Providence have been competing with each other. Despite sharing African

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60 Id. at 189.
62 See, powell, The “Racing” of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, supra note 42.
65 Id. at 120.
66 Id. Referencing data from the 1990 Census, Correa points out that given the option of “other race,” however, most respondents from every country except Cuba and Colombia preferred to identify as “other race” to black or White, although Colombians only “narrowly preferred” to self-identify as White. Id. at 121.
67 Id. at 123.
68 See, Delgado, supra note 26, at 57.
roots and a history of slavery and oppression, Caribbeans, who comprise a significant majority of Providence Latinos, tend to align with Whites.69

Similar to Young’s assertions regarding fluid political identity, Correa and Leal find that most Latinos self-identify primarily through national labels, and secondarily through panethnic labels.70 Correa and Leal conclude that this identity is being constructed in the United States, based on results showing that panethnic self-identification increases the further an individual is removed from the initial immigrant experience, the younger the respondent, and the greater the respondent’s education. Correa and Leal conclude that Latino self-identity seems to emerge most strongly on specific political issues, as opposed to corresponding to a common Latino political agenda. While stronger panethnic self-identity may indicate a weaker sense of common panethnic agenda than among other Latinos, panethnicity does have a significant effect on attitudes toward some policy issues, such as bilingual education. Latino panethnicity is also associated with notable increases in some forms of political participation.71 This research suggests that the fluid nature of identity formation and the multiple identities people carry mean that coalitional opportunities will vary depending on the context and its impact on identity, as well as the specific issue or ideology to be pursued by the coalition.

3. Perceptions of Discrimination

The literature also reports that Whites and Blacks have divergent views on equality of opportunity. McClain and Tauber cite a 1995 Washington Post survey that found that the majority of White Americans surveyed believed Blacks were doing as well or better than Whites economically and that racism was not a major problem in the U.S., while most Blacks surveyed saw themselves as economically disadvantaged and perceived discrimination as having increased.72 Although a study by Lincoln Quillian showed a decline in traditional prejudice in both the South and non-South,73 he also found that generally White support for race-based policies has mostly remained unchanged, especially in the South.74 Samson examined data from the Los Angeles subset of the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality collected between 1992 and 1994 from a household survey and an employer survey.75 He found that “factors that have significant effects on immigrants’ racial attitudes towards Blacks include the political

69 Id. at 22.
71 Id. at 228 and 237
72 McClain & Tauber, Racial Minority Group Relations in a Multiracial Society, in GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES 128 (MICHAEL JONES-CORREA ED., 2001); see also Richard Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites’ View of Blacks, WASHINGTON POST, July 11, 2001, at A1 (showing that Whites believe blacks have achieved relative parity with Whites across a number of indicators).
74 Id. at 847-48.
75 Frank L. Samson, Native/Black/Other: Exploring Immigrants’ Racial Attitudes Towards Blacks, Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Version 2.3, at 11 (May 24, 2002).
perspective of the immigrant, non-English interview language, and the problems and quality of the neighborhood in which the immigrant resides.\textsuperscript{76} Bobo and Hutchings state, “feelings of racial alienation have a collective dimension and become culturally shared,” and that these feelings “emerge from historical experience and the current social, political, and economic niches typically occupied by members of a racial group.”\textsuperscript{77} Also, their findings that racial minorities of lower income status have a greater tendency to view themselves in competition with other minority groups might suggest some interplay between perceptions and structural racism.

The literature provides further support for the opportunity for multiracial coalition depending on the context. Scholars argue that racial minorities tend to agree on the subordinate position of racial minorities in terms of opportunities, including substantial agreement as to how each group ranks in the hierarchy. Carole Uhlaner argues that those who see their groups as disadvantaged are more likely to perceive other groups as disadvantaged.\textsuperscript{78} There is substantial agreement between racial groups as to structure of opportunities, with likelihood of perception of another group’s disadvantage increasing with respondent’s education. Examining national survey data, McClain and Tauber note that racial minority groups tend to agree broadly that fewer opportunities are afforded to minority groups, although there are differences in which racial groups perceived commonalities with each other.\textsuperscript{79}

Another study shows that while racial minorities perceive each other in competition with other racial groups, these perceptions depend on various factors.\textsuperscript{80} Bobo and Hutchings analyzed data from the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey, a random computer-assisted telephone survey of adults living in households. The survey found that generally there were only modest levels of perceived zero-sum competition.\textsuperscript{81} For respondents who did perceive zero-sum competition with other groups, Black respondents tended to perceive greater zero-sum competition with Asians than with

\textsuperscript{76} Samson also found that generally younger cohorts of immigrants have more positive racial attitudes than older cohorts. \textit{Id.} at 23-24. He also found a negative correlation between an immigrant’s conservatism and positive racial attitude. \textit{Id.} at 25. Surprisingly, Samson found that generally education was not positively correlated with racial attitudes. \textit{Id.} at 24. Samson also found that Latino and Asian immigrants attitudes toward native blacks do not tend to be more negative than those of black and White immigrants.\textsuperscript{76} Samson cited the most important findings to be that social networks and Latino and Asian interviewer race-matching have significant effects on immigrants’ racial attitudes toward blacks.


\textsuperscript{78} See Carole J. Uhlaner, \textit{Perceived Discrimination and Prejudice and the Coalition Prospects of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans}, in \textit{RACIAL & ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA} 354

\textsuperscript{79} See, supra note 72, at 129.

\textsuperscript{80} Bobo & Hutchings, \textit{supra} note 77, at 951.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id.} at 958. They found that overall although a large number of people in each racial group sample perceived other groups as zero-sum competitors, in none of the groups did these people constitute a majority.
Latinos on all four competition measures, and Latino respondents\(^{82}\) tended to perceive greater competition with Asians than with Blacks.\(^{83}\) Levels of perception of zero-sum threat also depended on how an individual viewed the opportunities of his racial group. For instance, “individuals who perceive members of their own group as generally facing unfair treatment in the larger social order tend to be more likely to regard members of other groups as competitive threats.”\(^{84}\) Additionally, “African Americans and Latino respondents with low incomes are more likely to perceive other groups as zero-sum competitors.”\(^{85}\) It also mattered whether respondents had an individualist or structural view of poverty. Respondents with individualist views were more likely to view other racial groups as competitive threats than were those with structural views.

Is resolution of interracial tension necessary for successful multiracial coalition work to occur? Robert Bullard, in describing environmental justice coalitions in the South, indirectly suggests that at least on certain issues, tension resolution is not necessary.\(^{86}\) Bullard points out that in these coalitions racial and class barriers remain despite cross-racial agreement on environmental justice issues.\(^{87}\) In the context of community building, Kubisch et al. state, “[a]ttention to racial and cultural issues is [...] a prerequisite to successful work in distressed neighborhoods.”\(^{88}\) They conclude from their interviews of community building practitioners and community stakeholders and from their review of the social science literature, however, that community-building institutions do not do enough to “identify and address institutional and structural dimensions of racism.”\(^{89}\) Kubisch et al. note that practitioners have suggested that racial tensions must be addressed “head-on”, because they “can weaken the credibility and trust that is vital to the community-building process.”\(^{90}\)

4. Institutional Structure

Institutions play a role in structuring racial inequality. John Beggs argues that institutions at the local and national level influence race and gender inequality in employment.\(^{91}\) Analyzing 1980 census data, he found that “the more egalitarian the

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\(^{82}\) Majority (66.2%) of Mexican ancestry, 20.5% Central American, 5% South American, remainder other Hispanic (e.g., Puerto Rican, Caribbean). \textit{Id} at 958 n.7. There did not appear to be significant differences in responses across Hispanic sub-groups, according to Bobo and Hutchins. \textit{Id}. at 958-59 n.7.

\(^{83}\) \textit{Id}. at 958.

\(^{84}\) \textit{Id}. at 961-63.

\(^{85}\) \textit{Id}. at 967.


\(^{87}\) \textit{Id}.


\(^{89}\) \textit{Id}. at 58.

\(^{90}\) \textit{Id}. at 59.

\(^{91}\) John J. Beggs, \textit{The Institutional Environment: Implications for Race and Gender Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market}, AM. SOC. REV. 60(4) (Aug. 1995), at 613. He measures the effects of national institutional environment by measuring federal public sector employment. \textit{Id}. at 614. Beggs measured the effect of local institutional environments by looking at the proportion of industry employment that is located in
institutional environment, the less the inequality between Black men or Black women and White men.” Beggs also found that “Industries with stronger ties to the national institutional environment are more favorable in terms of jobs and earnings for Black men, Black women, and White women, relative to White men.” Beggs found that these effects exist even after accounting for industrial structure, human capital inequality, and other employment inequalities. In other words the effect of the institutional environment could not be explained by differences in productivity between or within industries.

Correa discusses how the different political institutional capacity of urban areas affects cities’ abilities to mediate interracial conflict and crises. He argues that at least two variables are pivotal to the likelihood of cooperation between ethnic and racial groups. Cooperation is dependent on the relative power of the racial groups in the area and on the institutional context of the city. Particularly important with respect to institutional context is whether cities have loose or tight networks, or horizontal or vertical networks, of organizations mediating between elected officials and residents. L.A., for example, is characterized by a horizontal political network, in which various layers of politics are disconnected from one another and political authority is dispersed and sometimes rendered impotent. This horizontal style is also reflected in nongovernmental organizations, where privatization of communal efforts is encouraged and fiscally independent community-based organizations are oriented to an alternative political vision versus changing city policy. The implications are that CBOs have little leverage over political officials and without additional resources to draw on are ill-prepared to respond to interracial crises, which the government has historically passed off to CBOs.

III. CASE STUDIES:

A. Criteria for Selection and Methodological Approach

In order to identify effective multi-racial/ethnic coalition work and gain understanding in how these efforts are sustained, and the supports needed for improvement, the IRP undertook case study research. We selected case study sites on the basis of three criteria presented in order of importance:

1. Demonstrated Success: A coalition was defined as “successful,” if it:
   • established a racially/ethnically diverse constituency;
   • garnered significant political attention;

states with higher or lower scores of equality. Id. at 615. He uses “the proportion of federal public sector employment in an industry to capture the effects of the national institutional environment on inequality in the industry.”

92 Id. at 612.
93 Id. at 615
94 See, supra note 56, at 184-85. He asserts, “Little attention has been paid to the interethnic negotiation of access and resources that takes place in the aftermath of [civil] disturbances, or to the institutional context in which these negotiations take place.” Id. at 196
95 Id. at 199-200.
• sustained political cooperation; and
• won an important reform victory or sustained continuing collective work on structural reforms that could impact low-income communities of color.

Demonstrated success was the most important criteria because the purpose of the report and toolkit are to identify and describe variables needed to create and support effective multi-racial coalitions that have strong potential to achieve structural reforms. This criteria should not be interpreted to mean that selected coalitions for the case studies have not had significant problems or do not face significant challenges. Racial and ethnic tensions and conflict, capacity issues and ongoing needs that are unmet in the work exist for all coalitions. The goal of the project, however, was to identify effective work and understand how it moves forward in light of or despite the problems encountered, as well as to identify additional forms of support for improving multiracial reform efforts.

2. Issue Area, Regional, and Coalitional Form Diversity - Issue area diversity related to structural opportunity was also an important criteria. Based on the IRP’s research and work, as well as the work of other researchers, it is evident that several specific areas of structural racism exist and produce racial and ethnic tensions and conflict. The project sought to identify how and to what extent multiracial coalitions worked to dismantle these structural arrangements. The issue areas included: work and wages; education; housing; civic engagement/effective public voice; health and environmental issues; transportation; immigration; and resource allocation. The project recognized that these issue areas are not mutually exclusive, but interact and overlap with one another in important ways. Therefore, the project did not rank them in any order of importance.

The project intentionally looked for regional diversity in case study sites because IRP hypothesized that contextual differences in economic, political and social structures, as well as demographic differences, would alter the priorities, structures and goals of multiracial coalitions. Because the literature is largely silent on the impact of comparative context on coalition formation, IRP felt it important to examine.

Coalitions may exist in different forms. IRP identified the following general descriptive formations:

• Formal or informal coalitions between the leadership of different racially/ethnically identified organizations;
• organizational relationships between organizations which do not work together formally as coalitions, but nonetheless do joint reform work;
• multi-racial relationships within a single organization; and
• formal coalitions between organizations.

Most writers and researchers have examined formal coalitions between organizations or have not been explicit about coalitional form and structure. Without regard to the formal structure of the work, the project assumed that successful multiracial work takes different forms. Also, because project assumptions included contextual
variations that impact form and structure of multiracial work, the IRP sought to examine different forms of coalitions to better understand this relationship.

3. Existing Documents and Research – The IRP began the process of identifying case sites through an extensive literature review. This selection criterion became less important as we realized the scarcity of literature focused explicitly on structural tensions and multi-racial/ethnic coalition formation and sustainability.

The project identified cases in New York City, Los Angeles and Mississippi. These cases met the project’s definition of success, diversity of issue areas of the work and diversity in coalitional structure, which will be discussed below in the discussion of each case study.

These cases also met the project’s goal of regional diversity, highlighting differences in history and context. We describe the history and context of each of the locations in detail in the relevant case study sections. It is worth noting some of the major similarities and differences here to highlight the diversity in site selections.

Both New York City and Los Angeles are global cities in that their multiculturalism is due, in part, to globalization of the economy and the fact that they are global economic centers. Both cities are large and profoundly diverse, having long histories of racial and ethnic diversity and segregation, but also have been experiencing large influxes of non-White immigrants over the past two decades. According to the 2000 census, New York City is about 26.6% African American, 9.8% Asian, 19% other races and 44.6% White. New York City also has a 27% Hispanic or Latino population and is 35% non-Hispanic White. Los Angeles is about 11% African American, 10% Asian, 32% other races (many who are Latino) and 47% White. Los Angeles also has a 46.5% Hispanic or Latino population and is 30% non-Hispanic White. The similarities end there. The economies of New York City and Los Angeles have some important differences. While New York City is home to the country’s financial services sector, Los Angeles continues to have a large manufacturing base and, of course, the film industry.

New York City is an “old” city. Los Angeles is a “new” city. New York is dense, while Los Angeles is sprawling. New York is three times as densely populated as Los Angeles. New York City has a relatively democratic transportation system with most residents reliant on the bus and subway systems. In Los Angeles, however, the transportation system is highly class-defined. Poor people take the bus, rail lines serve wealthy suburbs, and everyone else drives automobiles.

The relatively dense nature of New York is mirrored, to some extent, by its political structure. New York City’s population lives within a single local political jurisdiction governed by the Mayor and the City Council. Also, New York’s political structure, with sixty seats in the state Assembly and fifty-one in the City Council allows

\[96\] 2000 U.S. Census Bureau.
Los Angeles, on the other hand, has both a City Council structure and a County Board of Supervisors. Los Angeles County has eighty-eight separately incorporated jurisdictions and also unincorporated areas. Los Angeles has one-third as many State Assembly seats as New York City, and only a fifteen-member City Council. Its County Board of Supervisors has only five seats to govern over two million people.

Mississippi is a stark contrast to both New York and California with almost half of its population living in rural areas. It historically has and continues to have a primarily agricultural economy. It is also one of the poorest states in the country with one of the worst performing educational systems. Despite the growth of the Latino and Asian communities in Mississippi, these communities are still miniscule compared to the African American and White populations. According to the 2000 census, African Americans represent about one-third of the population (36.3%) of the state, while Latinos and Asians represent 1.4% and 0.7%, respectively. The thirteen counties of the Mississippi Delta region are largely African American. The African-American population ranges from a low of 54% (Yazoo County) to a high of 79% (Holmes County). The Delta is characterized by high unemployment and very high percentages of poverty. All but three of the counties have double-digit unemployment rates. Moreover, it has had one of the most recalcitrant histories of racism of any state in the South.

Given the very different social, economic, political and demographic profiles of New York City, Los Angeles and Mississippi, it may not be surprising that the coalitions examined in this report are very different from one another in history, structure, strategies and goals.

In New York City, the Community Alliance for the Environment (CAFE) is a neighborhood-based coalition of different racially and ethnically identifiable organizations. Primarily Latino and Jewish, these two communities have a thirty-year history of intense conflict produced by structural problems -- the scarcity of affordable housing and jobs, the allocation of policing resources and police abuse toward Latinos and African Americans -- CAFE has focused on environmental justice, a common interest, which does not implicate the traditional structural arrangements that produce conflict.

The Los Angeles Metropolitan Alliance (Met Alliance), on the other hand is a city-wide coalition made up of a wide variety of organizations including, community groups, labor, and issue-based organizations. Its constituency is predominantly African American and Latino and the work originated in South Central Los Angeles where tensions between these two groups have been high around the issues of jobs and political representation. It has focused on the creation of sustainable public sector jobs for low-income African Americans and Latinos in the poorest neighborhoods of the city.

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Finally, Concerned Citizens for Quality Special Education Programs (CCQSEP) is an informal coalition of delta-based African American activist community organizations and predominantly White state-wide disability rights groups. The disability rights groups have worked together in informal coalition for years, but within the past two years African American organizations have begun to work with the disability rights community around the improvement of public education for children with special needs. It is largely recognized by Mississippi lawmakers as the first and only Black/White coalition on education issues in a state that has a dismal educational achievement record and a long history of discrimination in education.

The project’s methodological approach to the case studies was a qualitative one. It began with a set of questions to answer about each coalition studied. Questions included:

• What is the history of the coalition?
• What is its structure and decision-making process?
• What is its strategy for reform, including use of research and data, and perceptions of contextual impact on coalitional efforts?
• What was its the response to tension/conflict between groups?
• What are its achievements, challenges and ongoing needs?

To answer these questions, the IRP conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews of coalition partners and observers, reviewed written materials and reports of the coalitions, including newspaper articles, scholarly works and other books and articles, and where possible, conducted observational site visits.

B. COMMUNITY ALLIANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

1. Structural context and community relations history

In New York, Black community residents and Korean store owners have experienced bad relations, particularly in the early 1990s, when Black leaders organized a boycott of Korean groceries. Also in the early 1990s, Blacks and Hasidic Jews in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, and Latinos and Hasidic Jews in Williamsburg Brooklyn also experienced conflict. There has been relatively little conflict between Blacks and Latinos, particularly as compared to Los Angeles. This relative lack of conflict may be explained in part by structural differences between New York City and other cities. It is worth noting the structural context of these relationships since the CAFE coalition includes Black and Latino participants. The history of Jews in New York generally and in Williamsburg, Brooklyn in particular will be examined separately.

a. Blacks and Latinos

1. Employment

Labor market competition between Blacks and new immigrants of color has been relatively low, despite the fact that both groups experience economic marginalization and that there are differences in social mobility between African Americans and Puerto Ricans. Latinos and African Americans have not benefited from job growth nor been
harmed by job losses in the same ways. Their respective histories of migration to the city and the impact of language have resulted in the two groups occupying different sectors of employment. For Latinos as a whole, immigration status is also a factor in sectoral representation, as well as employer biases and the structure of the economy.

African Americans have been present in the city in significant numbers for a longer period of time than Puerto Ricans. Blacks first began migrating to New York City after the abolition of slavery. Racism limited Blacks to domestic work and manual labor, but the population was very small. The Puerto Rican population, however, was smaller. At the turn of the century, only 300 Puerto Ricans resided in New York.  

World War II and the rapid expansion of manufacturing in the city fomented the next major wave of African American migrants from the South and the population increased dramatically. By 1940, 458,000 Blacks comprised 6.1% of the population. The Puerto Rican community grew during the first half of the twentieth century, largely employed as laborers and factory workers replacing Jewish and Italian factory workers. It was not until after World War II, however, that Puerto Ricans began coming into the city in large numbers.

By the mid-1960s, opportunities for African Americans in public sector employment increased as a result of civil rights victories and White departure from the city. By 1964, African Americans represented 23% of the workforce of sixty-six public agencies, compared to only 3% Latino representation in these agencies. But by the 1970s both African Americans and Latinos had expanded their public workforce participation. By 1970, African American and Latino males had very similar rates of employment, although Puerto Rican women were substantially more likely to be unemployed than African American women.

Between 1950 and 1970 the number of jobs in the city increased by about 275,000, with the largest increase confined to jobs in the service sectors. Puerto Ricans were disproportionately employed in the manufacturing sector, which experienced heavy job losses – more than 50% between 1970 and 1975. These economic shifts particularly impacted Puerto Rican women.

Employment expansion in the service sector disproportionately benefited African Americans because of limited language capacity of the Puerto Rican community. African American workers also experienced more protection from job losses because of their representation in government jobs and their relative job safety from layoffs based on

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99 Id.
100 Id. at 66-67.
101 Id. at 77. 61.
102 Id. at 86.
103 Id. at 86-87.
seniority. African Americans had been public workforce participants for longer than their Puerto Rican counterparts.\textsuperscript{104}

White workforce departures from New York City continued. Wright and Ellis estimate that more than 250,000 native born Whites retired or exited the city’s workforce between 1990 and 1997.\textsuperscript{105} These workforce departures benefited immigrants.

In the 1970s, native Latinos experienced minor job gains and held different jobs than Blacks. But these differences now have begun to create “emerging patterns of comparative advantage” for native Latinos over African Americans. Despite job growth, in the 1970s and 1980s, in the 1990s African American public sector opportunities began eroding, while expanding in the service sector. Latinos, on the other hand, had only modest advances in the service sector and more notable advances in the public sector.\textsuperscript{106}

There has been research suggesting public sector job competition between African Americans and Latinos.\textsuperscript{107} In New York City, Latinos are under-represented in the government workforce. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2001, the estimated proportion of employed African American workers represented in the government workforce was 20.1\%, while that of employed Latinos was only 9.4\%, and that of employed Whites was 10.6\%.\textsuperscript{108} This does not appear to have fomented major conflict, however between Blacks and Latinos.

The lack of job competition, however, does not mean that Blacks and Latinos share similar income levels. Latinos continue to experience the lowest income levels in the New York City. Year 2000 census figures show Latinos’ median income lagging far behind all other pan-ethnic groups at $27,952. African Americans were the next lowest paid group with a median income of $35,637, which was substantially higher than that of Latinos. Asians’ median income was $41,411 and Whites were the highest paid group at $51,054. Interestingly, with the exception of Asians, whose median income levels remained stagnant, the median income for all groups increased between 1990 and 2000, with African Americans experiencing the greatest increase of 11.4%. Whites’ median incomes increased by 7.6%, while Latinos’ median income increased by 5.4%.\textsuperscript{109}

Importantly, immigrant groups do not have the same comparative employment opportunities or challenges as they did in the 1980s and 1990s. For the first time foreign-born Whites – generally immigrants from the former Soviet Union and its successor states, have accounted for much of the replacement opportunities created by White out-migration. Immigrant Blacks tend to have jobs in growth sectors like advanced services,
private sector basic services and public administration. Today, immigrant Latinos are most able to find employment in the retail and personal services trades and continue to be disproportionately represented in the shrinking manufacturing sector.  

Wright and Ellis project that the number of native born Whites, who now make up about one third of the workforce in the city, will continue to decline in numbers and that immigrant groups will provide much of the replacement labor. At some point, however, they predict that the out-migration of Whites will slow and that the city’s new immigrants will have a more dismal employment picture. This will make worker skills, education, employer preferences, discrimination, racism, union exclusion of minorities, and job networks much stronger determinants of ethnic group employment.  

2. Effective Voice

African Americans have experienced some situational advantages over Puerto Rican immigrants by virtue of their longer presence in New York City. Racial segregation and public housing policy has concentrated African American residents in public housing projects. While detrimental in other ways, this context, however, has given African Americans a stable residential environment and population density, which contributes to the potential for more effective political voice. Puerto Ricans, on the other hand, began migrating in large numbers and entered into a worsening affordable housing shortage. Therefore, their housing has been more vulnerable and more diffuse. Neighborhoods of Puerto Rican concentration, such as Williamsburg, East Harlem and the South Bronx, traditionally have been sufficiently mixed neighborhoods requiring Puerto Ricans to share resources and political power with other groups in a way that African Americans have not.

African Americans, having resided in the city for a longer time have had more time to develop political and cultural institutions and to create networks between the two. Puerto Ricans had been relatively slow to develop such institutions. This may be explained in part by the unintentional demobilizing role of the New York branch of the Commonwealth Office of the Puerto Rican government, which had a dominant role in providing services to and supporting Puerto Rican entrants to the United States. Return migration to Puerto Rico, facilitated by the flow of capital and opportunities, also made the community more transient and, therefore, development of such institutions more difficult.

110 Foreign-born Asians are also overly concentrated in manufacturing but have a higher share of jobs in professional services as well. Foreign-born Asians’ largest positive shift is into retail trade but, unlike Latinos, they are also making significant gains in advanced services like the financial, insurance and real estate sectors.

111 Supra note 105.

112 See Torres, supra note 98, at 69.

113 Id.

114 Id. at 72-73.

115 Id. at 74
Even the natures of the religious institutions of both communities are very different. While African American churches have been indigenous institutions, led by African Americans, Puerto Ricans have historically been Catholic. The Catholic Church hierarchy has not generally resulted in indigenous leadership and the church itself had not always been an aggressive advocate for reforms to benefit Puerto Ricans.  

Despite what would seem to present coalitional opportunities, New York has fared poorly in building multiracial coalitions. Blacks and Puerto Ricans have a long history of political mobilization and have had legislative proportionality. At the same time, New York City has been called “politically fragmented” within pan-ethnic groups. During the 1970s African Americans and Puerto Ricans were generally aligned in battles for community control of schools, the welfare rights movement and the functioning of community action programs established by the War on Poverty. Puerto Ricans were generally involved in coalition with African Americans and White liberals on these issues, but as junior partners. Departures from these joint efforts included the fight for bilingual education, in which African Americans were not hostile but did not participate, and the electoral front where the two groups began to find themselves in conflict. There were also tensions within the anti-poverty programs when African Americans and Latinos fought over money and personnel decisions, often opposed each other when it came to participation on city agency advisory commissions and fought over the fielding of candidates for school board elections and other positions within the community control of schools demonstration projects.

John Mollenkopf points out that African American and Latino political mobilization has often been at odds, with each group not generally supporting the other at the polls. The election of David Dinkins in 1989 as the first African American mayor of the city was an exception to this pattern. But after his election, his constituency became disillusioned with him and Latinos “defected,” aiding the election of Rudolf Giuliani, a White Republican, in the next term. One major public conflict between the Dinkins administration and the Latino political leadership involved the disproportionate appointment of African Americans to the city’s redistricting commission and the resulting allocation of council seats. Dinkins based the appointments not on representation in population, which would have increased Latino representation, but on the Latino electorate (a much smaller number due to citizenship status) and geographic concentration. This contributed to Dinkin’s failure to win reelection, but the

\[\text{Id. at 70-71.}\]
\[\text{Jennifer Hochschild & Reveil Rogers, Race Relations in a Diversifying Nation, in NEW DIRECTIONS: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN A DIVERSIFYING NATION, AT 65 (JAMES S. JACKSON ED., 2000) at 67.}\]
\[\text{See Torres, supra note 98, at 78.}\]
\[\text{See Torres, supra note 98, at 84.}\]
\[\text{See Torres, supra note 98, at 85.}\]
\[\text{John Mollenkopf, New York: The Great Anomaly, PS Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), 591-97, at 593.}\]
\[\text{See Hochschild & Rogers Supra note 117 at 67.}\]
\[\text{Id. at 68-69.}\]
redistricting effort resulted in a doubling of African American council representation (from 6 to 12) and a tripling of Latino representation (from 3 to 9).\textsuperscript{124}

By 1992 African Americans and Latinos together held 21 of the 53 city council seats, 6 of the city’s 14 congressional seats and 6 of 25 state senate and 24 of sixty state assembly seats.\textsuperscript{125} Yet this political representation has not materialized into the building of multiracial electoral coalitions.

The institutional nature of politics in New York City does not support multiracial political cooperation. As Mollenkopf points out, “no institutional mechanism currently facilitates the cooperation of the disparate elements that have historically powered [a liberal reform movement].”\textsuperscript{126} New York City runs on a party machine tradition, today institutionalized in the “regular” or party organizations, largely located in the four boroughs outside of Manhattan, which also contain the largest segments of the population of color in the city. The party “regulars,” as political scientists call them, impact minority political mobilization in key ways. Party regulars are responsible for sponsoring community based organizations for city funding. Thus, support for a “non-regular” candidate or direct opposition to a favored “regular” candidate can cost a community based organization its city funding.\textsuperscript{127}

b. Jews

As stated earlier, Blacks and Jews, particularly the Hasidim, have been in conflict in New York City. Jews are an historic immigrant group and Jewish immigration into the city continues. Political scientists have examined the existence and possibility of Black/Jewish electoral alliances. (\textit{e.g.}, Sonenshein, Mollenkopf). But these alliances appear to require an ideologically liberal Jewish community. As will be discussed below, major demographic shifts within the Jewish community in New York City has significantly changed the nature of this traditionally liberal community.

1. History

With nearly 2 million resident Jews, New York State has the largest Jewish community in North America and New York City alone accounts for over one-third of all Jews in the United States. New York City remains the principal port of entry and site of settlement for new Jewish immigrants to the United States including Iranian, Israeli and Russian Jews. It also has the longest standing Jewish communities in the country. As a result, New York City is widely viewed as both the organizational and cultural “capital” of the American Jewish community with the majority of major American Jewish organizations and institutions based in Manhattan. Many of these institutions formed as a reaction to anti-Semitism prevalent through out the city and the United States.\textsuperscript{128}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[125]{Mollenkopf, 1997, 99}
\footnotetext[126]{\textit{See supra}, note 121, at 594.}
\footnotetext[127]{\textit{Id.} at 594-95.}
\end{footnotes}
Before World War II, the New York City Jewish community was largely Eastern and Central European Jews who immigrated to the US in search of economic opportunity. They tended to live in Manhattan. Following World War II, two forces reshaped the New York Jewish community. First, suburbanization resulted in a national redistribution of the American Jewish population from New York City to its suburbs, as it did for non-Jewish Whites. In 1940, fewer than 100,000 Jews lived in all the suburbs of New York City. By 1960, the Jewish population residing in the suburbs reached 735,000. Second, several hundred thousand New York Jews relocated throughout the country, particularly in southern California and Florida.

During and after World War II, the first Hasidic Jews, survivors of the Holocaust, immigrated to the US. The Hasidim, or "pious ones" in Hebrew, is a branch of Orthodox Judaism, which began in the mid-18th century in Central and Eastern Europe. It derives from a mystic tradition that stressed joy, faith, and ecstatic prayer, accompanied by song and dance. The Hasidism represented a conservative call to spiritual renewal and a protest against the prevailing religious establishment and culture. According to Arthur Hertzberg, the Hasidim and other Orthodox Jews who emigrate after World War II were very different from the pre-war Jewish immigrants. He explains that the post-war immigrants’ primary quest was for freedom to practice their orthodox religion.

Non-religious Jewish immigrants including thousands of Russian Jews and Israelis settled in Brooklyn and Queens beginning in the 1970s, a period which also saw the revival of Jewish life in Manhattan's Upper West Side.

More recently, the Jewish community in New York has experienced new dramatic demographic shifts. According to the 2002 New York Jewish Community Study, a poll of 30,000 respondents, four in ten Jews in New York are Russian and religiously Orthodox. While the overall Jewish population in the city, and its Long Island and Westchester suburbs, has remained stable in the last decade at 1.4 million, the Russian population has nearly tripled in 10 years, to more than 200,000, and the Orthodox community jumped 6 percent, to 19 percent of the Jewish households.

This shift occurred as a result of a second large wave of Jewish relocation to the suburbs. Middle-class Reform and Conservative Jews, the traditional center of the Jewish community, have moved to the suburbs in large numbers over the decade. Those remaining in the city have experienced increased levels of poverty with one in five Jewish households living in poverty. The study also reported that the percentage of Jews over the age of 75, many of them poor, doubled to 11% over the last ten years.

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The demographic changes in the metropolitan Jewish community have impacted the city’s boroughs differently. While a significant number of Jews -- 45% -- left the Bronx since 1991, Manhattan and Queens lost 20% and 21%, respectively, while the Brooklyn and Staten Island Jewish population grew by 24% and 27%, respectively. Both immigration of Russian Jews and the Hasidim’s high birth rates have fueled Brooklyn’s Jewish population growth.

2. The Hasidim

A central theme in Hasidism is remaining “spiritually clean” with a focus on biblical concepts of purity and contamination. These beliefs result in a dogma of separation from “outsiders” or non-Hasidim, including non-Hasidic Jews. The Hasidim also actively maintain their language, Yiddish, and dress as identifiable markers of the faithful. The Satmar sect is one of the stricter of the Hasidic sects, eschewing the study of English.

The Hasidim maintain separation from outsiders through separate school systems, which must fulfill minimum requirements set by the state, but which are substantially different from public schools. Boys and girls receive separate and quite different educations, beginning with pre-school. Girls attend all-girl schools through the age of seventeen or eighteen. Boys have a longer school day, after the age of eleven, with more of a focus on religious education, while the girls learn more English and history. Girls’ religious training in school focuses on practical religious knowledge, while the boys’ religious training focuses on the Talmud, the 63-volume compendium of Jewish law and commentary. The Hasidim do not embrace college or graduate education because it is seen as a source of cultural contamination. As a result, in sharp contrast to any other Jewish community, the Hasidim do not produce many professionals.

In New York City, most Hasidic men work in small retail, import/export, and manufacturing businesses in Brooklyn and the Lower East Side of Manhattan. Many provide goods and services to the community, such as teaching, or the manufacture and distribution of kosher food items, religious articles, publications, or Hasidic clothing. Hasidim are also involved in the diamond, garment, and discount retail electronics industries.

Of the New York City Hasidic women who work outside the home (usually after their children are grown) most are employed by close relatives in their small businesses or by the community as teachers, administrators, community social workers or other functionaries. There are also women who run small businesses, usually services or small manufacturing, themselves.

Like many religious communities, the Hasidim themselves are divided into separate sects with divergent and sometimes contradictory beliefs. Hasidic communities are known as "courts" that are spiritually centered around a specific dynastic leader known as a Rebbe, who has a dual political and religious leadership role in the court.
In Williamsburg where the largest Hasidic groups settled, they were primarily Hungarian in origin -- the Satmars and the Klausenbergs. According to Mintz, the Hasidim experienced a rapid and initially successful resettlement.\textsuperscript{132} The Lubavitcher and the Bobover courts settled in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, while the third major area of settlement occurred in Boro Park, Brooklyn. But these Hasidic communities grew at a slower pace than that of Williamsburg. Estimates in the mid-1960s put the number of Hasidim in New York City at between forty and fifty thousand with the Williamsburg Satmar the largest group at 1,300 families.

There are twelve principal Hasidic courts, though many of the smaller ones still exist.\textsuperscript{133} There is overlap and movement between the courts, but there are also ideological tensions. For example, the Satmars are vehemently anti-Zionist, believing that only the Messiah, and not man, can resurrect Israel. Their anti-Zionism puts them in direct conflict with the Lubavitcher sect of the Hasidim, which is Zionist.

By the mid-1980s, the Hasidic community had grown substantially. Harris, in 1985, estimates 200,000 of the world’s 250,000 Hasidim live in the United States, with approximately 100,000 in Brooklyn and most of the rest in other parts of New York City and its suburbs. The number of Hasidim in New York has doubled, from around fifty thousand to over one hundred thousand, in twenty years. Many of the courts also have branches elsewhere in the United States, Israel, Canada, England, South America, Eastern Europe and Russia.\textsuperscript{134}

c. Williamsburg/Greenpoint Neighborhood

Williamsburg and Greenpoint, Brooklyn are actually two distinct neighborhoods in terms of ethnic make-up and community identity. Williamsburg is largely Latino and Hasidic, while Greenpoint is largely a conglomeration of White ethnic immigrants, including Irish Americans, Italian Americans and Polish Americans. But they are also often overlapping neighborhoods for the purpose of political representation and resource sharing and there is significant interaction between the two communities. For example, they are both located in Community District 1 and share a local school board. Therefore, this report generally refers to both neighborhoods as one, although it also discusses the Williamsburg section of the community in particular detail.

Williamsburg is a heavily industrial area, with 38% of land use being industrial or manufacturing. Only 26% of the land is used for single or multi-family dwellings. The late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries marked Williamsburg’s economic hey-day given its proximity to an active port (Williamsburg lies on the East River) and a major market. The Williamsburg waterfront had docks, shipyards, warehouses, distilleries,

\textsuperscript{132} Jerome Mintz, \textit{Legends of the Hasidim} (1968) at p. 39.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{134} Liz Harris \textit{Holy Days: The World of a Hasidic Family} (1985).
taverns, mills, metal works, breweries, and small sugar refineries. It was even a vacation spot for the wealthy.\footnote{11211 Magazine, \textit{Social history is written on the landscape}, \url{www.11211magazine.com/history/history5.html}. Brooklyn, including Williamsburg, had the highest number of slaves per capita in New York until the abolition of slavery in 1827. \textit{Id}.}

Before the completion of the Williamsburg Bridge, connecting the neighborhood to downtown Manhattan, the wealthy industrialist owners of the Williamsburg based businesses also lived there. With the opening of the bridge the population expanded rapidly, causing the elite industrialists to flee. By the end of World War I, most of the residents were working-class and poor and lived in crowded six-story tenements.

In the 1920s, manufacturing increased. As a result of the 1930s New Deal, the Williamsburg Houses, the city's first housing project, was built. Williamsburg historically has had some of the worst housing stock in the city and urban renewal policies began to impact the community. In the 1950s and 1960s, slums were torn down so the building of new housing projects did not increase the number of housing units in the neighborhood. Urban renewal, the increase in industrial activity in the neighborhood and its bisection by the newly built Brooklyn Queens Expressway resulted in a steady population decline in Williamsburg.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Williamsburg’s Puerto Rican population increased, as did the Hadisic population, and the groups settled in close proximity to one another in the southwest corner of Williamsburg. During this time, manufacturing industry - an important source of employment for the Puerto Ricans - declined, affecting Williamsburg sharply. Between 1961 and 2000 Williamsburg lost 83,000 manufacturing jobs.\footnote{\textit{Id}.}

Effective grassroots activism did not begin in the community until the 1970s, when arson, crime, and White flight characterized the neighborhood. Between 1970 and 1980, the Williamsburg/Greenpoint neighborhood experienced significant population declines, from 317,620 residents in 1970 to 240,625 residents in 1980. Population increases, however, began in the 1980s due, in part, to in-migration of White artists from Manhattan in search of affordable studios. In 1985, to support artists, the Board of Estimate authorized residential use of commercial loft space in the neighborhood.

While the size of the population has not returned to its 1970 size, it has continued to increase between the 1980 and 2000 censuses. According to the 2000 census, the neighborhoods of Williamsburg/Greenpoint, Brooklyn had a population of almost 265,000, although population growth between 1990 and 2000 began to slow. Unlike some neighborhoods in New York, which experienced very large population growth in the past ten years, Williamsburg/Greenpoint grew by only 8,000.\footnote{1990 and 2000 Census Bureau, Geolytics.}
The racial and ethnic make-up of the community has been changing with the population growth figures. Since 1990, only the White population has increased in the neighborhood. Whites made up 30% of the population in 1990 and 31.5% in 2000. The Latino and African-American populations have been decreasing. Latinos represented just over 43.5% of the neighborhoods in 1990, but just over 41% in 2000. African-Americans represented over 23% of the population in 1990 and just under 20% of the population in 2000. Asian-American/Pacific Islanders are the only non-White groups to have increased population in Williamsburg/Greenpoint, but their numbers are still small – 2.6% in 1990 and 3.6% in 2000.

Despite gentrification, the neighborhood is still a predominantly immigrant community. The foreign born population increased from almost 23% in 1990 to almost 30% in 2000. According to The Newest New Yorkers: An analysis of immigration to NYC in the early 1990's, published in 1996 by the NYC Department of City Planning, 6,641 new immigrants settled in Williamsburg from 1990 to 1994, arriving at an increasing rate over the four year period. The majority of immigrants, 51.8%, were from the Dominican Republic. While Dominicans settling in Williamsburg accounted for only 3.1% of Dominicans immigrating to New York City during this period, they amounted to 44.4% of Williamsburg’s 1990 Dominican population. Williamsburg also experienced a significant influx of Polish immigrants from 1990 to 1994, primarily settling in the Northside, a community that borders Greenpoint, home to a large Polish-American and Polish émigré population. The high birth rate of the Hasidic community in South Williamsburg continues to be an important factor affecting increased housing demand. Estimates are that approximately forty-five thousand Satmar Hasidim live in Williamsburg.

There are significant differences in the foreign born status and level of citizenship status across these racial categories. Less than one third (28.5%) of Whites in the neighborhood are foreign born. Of this number almost two thirds are not naturalized citizens. Just over one third (33.9%) of the Latino population is foreign born, but many of them (25.7%) are not citizens. Of the Black members of the community, only 13.9% are foreign born and about half of them are not naturalized.

Gentrification has impacted the affordability of rental housing in Williamsburg, having placed significant upward pressure on rents in the Northside and Southside of the neighborhood and has contributed to the displacement of the much lower income immigrant residents already living there.

2. Structural Causes of Tension and Conflict in Williamsburg/Greenpoint

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138 Id.
139 Id.
141 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
There have been essentially three major structural fights between the communities of color in the neighborhood:

1. Affordable housing;
2. Schools (including school board representation and the allocation of resources); and,
3. Policing (alignment with Hasidim and Hasidim community patrols), which is also a resource allocation and community control issue.

It is important to note that there is a history of tensions between Latino and African-American residents, on the one hand, and Polish and Italian residents on the other. The tensions between Latino and Black residents and the Hasidim are partially a result of the way that Polish and Italian community leaders used the Hasidim to perpetuate their political control of the neighborhood. The competition for community control around issues such as schools, housing and other resources, was also a competition over racial identification of the neighborhood (e.g., control of schools also helped to control in-migration).

a. Housing

Perhaps the most public, long-standing and damaging of the conflicts between Latino, African American and Hasidic community residents has been around access to affordable housing. First, there simply isn’t enough affordable housing to meet the needs of low income Latino, African American and Hasidic residents, and second, because the Satmar Hasidim beliefs require that they avoid contact with non-believers and live within walking distance of their places of worship. These requirements have led to the Satmar Hasidim working very hard to acquire large blocks of public and subsidized housing for their exclusive use. Inter-racial/ethnic tensions related to affordable housing have existed for thirty years between Latinos and African Americans on one side and the Hasidim on the other, periodically erupting into riots, demonstrations and court battles.

Housing conflict between the Hasidim, including the United Jewish Organization (UJO), a CAFÉ member organization, and the Latino community has persisted throughout the work of CAFE. Vito Lopez, chair of the State Assembly’s Housing Committee, threatened to block a UJO sponsored housing development if it contained too many subsidized apartments earmarked for Hasidim, or if Latino leaders are denied input on the project.\textsuperscript{142} The project is the second to be sponsored by the United Jewish Organizations and the development deal was completed on the last day of the Giuliani administration. Rabbi Niederman, the UJO’s leader, sharply criticized Lopez in the media.

The planned project would create 350 apartments in two 25-story towers overlooking the East River. The immediate vicinity of the brewery site is heavily Hasidic. But Los Sures, a Latino nonprofit housing group, has argued that the proximity of the site to a large Latino population should allow for Latinos to have input into the

\textsuperscript{142} Adam Dickter, \textit{Bedroom Brawl in Williamsburg}, Jewish Week, 7 June 2002.
development plan and allocation process. New York City’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development gave the UJO control of the project. Latino community-based organizations have signed similar agreements with the city for sites in nearby Bushwick, which is heavily Latino.

The UJO selected developer for the site agreed to set aside 40 percent of the units, or 140 apartments, for subsidized housing. The remaining 210 units are to be sold at market value. Units are to be allocated through a city-supervised lottery, but Latino leaders argue that Hasidic families, which are generally quite large, have an edge on Latino applicants in vying for units because the initial plan filed with HPD calls for 27 of the subsidized units to contain more than three bedrooms. A majority of the subsidized units, 63, would have three bedrooms. Lopez stated that originally there were to be many more four- and five-bedroom units, but city officials pressed for a greater number of smaller units. Niederman complained in the press that Los Sures’ developed housing on predominantly Latino South 4th Street, comprised of two-family, owner-occupied homes that include a rental unit, consists entirely of three-bedroom units, making them unsuitable for large Hasidic families.

b. School Board Fight

Williamsburg/Greenpoint is in school district 14. In the late 1980s the Schools Chancellor reportedly referred to district 14 as the most colonized in the city of New York. The district 14 superintendent said to be responsible for this colonization was a White former Physical Education coach. Luis Garden Acosta, founder and Executive Director of El Puente, another CAFÉ partner, stated that the superintendent had provided Title I money to the Hasidim community by means of providing English and Math teachers for religious education of the Hasidim children. Acosta claims that this financial assistance to yeshivas in the neighborhood has served to control the White (Polish and Italian) dominated school board and to keep Latinos off of the school board. To do that, the Superintendent has needed the Hasidim to run for school board seats. According to tradition, the Satmar Hasidim vote is presented as a unified block, and is directed by the Rebbe, suggesting significant political voice. Acosta indicates that amongst the special favors the Hasidim have received from the Superintendent for their political cooperation, is the rental of three public school buildings and a former police precinct to the Hasidim for $1 per year.

Parents sued the Board of Education to stop the use of federal money to send city public school teachers into private religious schools. That court battle ended in a 1986 Supreme Court entanglement clause ruling.

Within this history, one singular act of the Superintendent galvanized the Latino community and led to the first real multi-ethnic coalition related to the schools. Acosta explained that the Superintendent gave the Hasidim a portion of the school building, Public School 16, a large predominantly Latino elementary school, for a Hasidic girls’

143 see for example www.billburgh.com/history/ethnic_diversity.cfm
www.blockmagazine.com/features/i13v1_index.html
remedial education program. Prior to this donation, PS 16 parents had accompanied their Kindergartners into the classroom through an entrance reserved for the 5 to 6 year olds. This was important to parents, who were concerned for their children’s’ safety entering a very large school with fifth and sixth graders.

On the first day of the school year, parents arrived at school with their children and school officials informed them that they had to leave their 5 and 6 year olds at the main entrance of the school. Furthermore, others were told that their Kindergarteners would be bused to another school. Not only were the Hasidim given a wing of the school with a separate entrance, that wing had also been walled off from the rest of the school. The wall became an important symbol of segregation and the special treatment Hasidim received. Acosta indicated that offensive remarks made by Hasidic parents regarding the PS 16 students further inflamed the issues. For example, he stated that a Hasidic parent was quoted in an article in the Village Voice Magazine, stating a need to separate their children from the “animals.”

El Puente, an activist development organization, quickly became active in the battle over “the wall.” At that time, the ethnic tensions in the neighborhood were so severe that Mayor Dinkins’ office called El Puente weekly for updates on tensions and the potential for violence. El Puente organized parents, who were keeping their children out of school, including White parents, who didn’t want their children bused to another school. To avoid charges of anti-Semitism, it even identified one Jewish parent (not Hasidic) who agreed to be a public face on the fight against “the wall.” They named themselves “United Parents Against the Wall.” Brooklyn Legal Services brought a state court lawsuit against the school system based on the Entanglement Clause of the First Amendment. They won the court case in the Appellate Division.

The parents group transformed itself into “United Parents to Save Our Children” to deal with the issues of representation on the school board. They began to organize to get Latino parents on the school board for the next school board elections. It included a multiracial group (Latina, African-American and Italian) called Neighborhood Women of Greenpoint. A White organization in Greenpoint organized against the new coalition’s efforts, allegedly to stop “the hordes” from taking over the school district. Nonetheless, the coalition was successful in electing two Latinos and an African-American to the school board.

According to Acosta, it was a contentious election. The coalition had additional candidates in the race, but the White group, made up largely of Italian Americans, targeted them to get them thrown off the ballot for various technicalities. A significant problem in registering Latinos to vote is the use of both the paternal and maternal surnames. Officially, most people might register to vote using both surnames. But when they signed petitions to get residents on the ballot, they might use only the paternal surname. This deficiency could result in the petition signature being invalidated. The coalition was only 100 votes shy of winning a fourth seat. This fourth seat would have been significant because the school board is a nine-member body. In the long-term, they were hoping to take control of the election for the Congressional District.
c. **Policing**

In addition to the representation issues on the local school board, the Latino and African American community residents had a long history of anger over police conduct toward them and examples of favoritism and special treatment toward the Hasidim. Acosta described a climate in which the police did not enforce laws against the Hasidim and the Hasidim were allowed to do their own policing.

In the early 1980s, the Hasidim created the Hsomim Patrol, a civilian Hasidic patrol to “keep Latinos and African Americans in check,” as Acosta stated. When non-Whites walked down their block, the Hsomim Patrol would stop and ask, “What are you doing here?” The most notorious incident in the neighborhood was when Hasidic residents beat Frederick Pinkney, a 19 year old African American into a coma. No one was arrested. Acosta tells that in another incident, the Hsomim Patrol chased two plain-clothed police officers, who were not White, all the way to the police precinct. The Captain at the precinct took no action against the Hsomim. The police took little action against any Hasids after 900 rioted at the precinct house to demand the release of a Hasidic man who had been arrested. Eventually there was only one arrest.

A journalist for the New York Daily News, Juan Gonzales, uncovered this unofficial police policy of special treatment for Hasidic residents and publicized it. It was an incident in which a Hasidic man in an apartment building sexually abused a girl. The building security officers caught the man and called the police. When the police arrived, they told the security guards that they could not arrest a Hasidic man without a Sergeant present.

According to Acosta, so complete was the power of the Hasidim over the local police precinct, that when a Hasidic man wandered in off the street and sexually molested a female police officer *inside* her own office, the police simply allowed the man to be tried by the Rabbinical courts. A Latino officer also complained that when the police had to meet quotas for traffic violations, superiors instructed them not to ticket the Hasidic residents.

These events around the sexual assault of the female officer and the discriminatory ticketing would not have become public without Acosta’s efforts. As a local leader, he heard about the incidents and spoke to the female and Latino officers to ask them to come forward and make their stories public. If it were not for the fact that Acosta had a relationship with then Mayor Dinkins, from whom he was able to secure assurances about the safety and security of the officers, they would not have come forward.

3. **History of the coalition, its structure and work**

The Community Alliance for the Environment is primarily a coalition of two different community organizations and a statewide organization. The core participating organizations are very different from one another. El Puente, founded in 1982 by Luis Garden Acosta, the President, is an activist development organization, based on the
heavily Latino south side of Williamsburg. It has three community center sites in Williamsburg and Bushwick, Brooklyn, which focus on community development initiatives in the areas of community health, environment and economic justice. El Puente also runs a public high school - El Puente Academy for Peace and Justice. The United Jewish Organizations (UJO) is an organization of synagogues of the ultra-orthodox Hasidic Jewish community through out New York City. In Williamsburg, the Hasidim reside in the north side of the neighborhood. The NY Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), a predominantly White liberal state-wide consumer, environmental and government reform organization, was founded in 1973 to effect policy reforms while training students and other New Yorkers to be advocates. It engages in training activities, research and lobbying.

CAFE is a coalition of organizations, but has an informal structure in the sense that it has no coalition staff or office. It has been the subject of some examination by researchers and writers. One writer has referred to CAFE as a “tactical” coalition, characterizing it as an interest-based coalition that lacks cultural or ideological cohesion, but whose members share an interest in a particular issue – in this case preventing the location of an incinerator in the community. A political scientist might refer to CAFE as a “Disjointed” Coalition. Yet, at least one coalition partner saw the issue-based advocacy work also as a means to achieving a greater and longer-term cooperative relationship with the Hasidim on other issues to improve the overall health and well being of the neighborhood as a whole and the Puerto Rican and African American communities in particular.

In terms of Delgado’s coalitional definitions, CAFE might most accurately be categorized as a multiracial issue-based coalition. Once one examines the history of the coalitional work and its evolution and development of allies on a particular issue—preventing the construction of an incinerator in the neighborhood - the coalition is more properly characterized as multiple coalitions with different life spans and purposes. There is a primary coalition between El Puente and the UJO that is somewhat broader in scope than its anti-incinerator campaign relationship with NYPIRG. But it also entered into strategic alliances with other organizations outside of the Williamsburg/Greenpoint community to stop the incinerator. Its relationship with these groups was substantially different than its primary relationship amongst the core groups.

The city’s plan to place an incinerator in the Brooklyn Navy Yard in the Williamsburg neighborhood emerged in 1979 after the state pressed the city to abandon its exclusive use of the Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island for garbage disposal. The 55 story incinerator was planned to generate 465 million kilowatt hours of electricity a year by burning 3000 tons of City trash daily, including toxic and non-recyclable materials.

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145 Id., Shaw, at 84.
Although there had been opposition to the incinerator for years, the major resistance began in September 1991, when Mayor Dinkins, shocked the Williamsburg and environmental communities by announcing that the city would move forward with the plan. NYPIRG conducted an analysis of the project and concluded that the incinerator would emit a half-ton of lead each year and be Brooklyn’s largest producer of nitrogen oxide, a component of smog. It began an effort to educate communities on the plan and the dramatic health consequences on the project, but it lacked any base within communities like Williamsburg to do so effectively.

EL Puente had been working on environmental justice issues at the time. It had created a youth group, which named itself the Toxic Avengers. The Toxic Avengers’ primary project was the closing and clean-up of the Radiac Corporation’s toxic waste dumping site in Williamsburg where it stored toxic, flammable, radioactive waste just one block away from a public school, and adjacent to homes and businesses. The Toxic Avengers conducted research and learned that Radiac no longer held a federal permit, violated buffer zone requirements and site had never been the subject of an environmental impact study.

Neighborhood residents were not even aware that the facility existed. The Toxic Avengers began to educate the community by conducting a sidewalk graffiti campaign to inform pedestrians how much time it would take for a mushroom cloud from an explosion at the Radiac site to reach him or her at that spot. The Toxic Avengers decided that they needed the Hasidim to join the fight. One of the youth leaders asked Acosta to get in touch with the Hasidim and request their participation in the campaign.

Acosta had been trying to meet with the leadership of the Hasidim for a long time. They had never agreed. The Hasidim viewed EL Puente as deeply anti-Semitic because of its complaints about issues from schools, to housing to policing. It was the Toxic Avenger leadership who pressed Acosta to try once again to meet with the Hasidim on this specific issue because, as they argued, a mushroom cloud would poison the Hasidim too.

Acosta contacted David Pollak, a Vice President at the Jewish Community Relations Council, which had just made a connection with the Hasidim. Pollak was excited that Acosta had called because there was a new leader of the UJO, Rabbi David Niederman, who was described as being more open to dialogue than the previous leader. In a momentous turn of events, Rabbi Niederman agreed to meet with Acosta and other community leaders, if they would assure his safety and security. Acosta made such assurances and the meeting was scheduled. It is noteworthy that Niederman had no prior experience with community-level work, but had significant diplomatic skills having spent his career in international Jewish refugee work.

Niederman met with EL Puente without any entourage. Acosta described the meeting as a “watershed moment.” Given the thirty year history of conflict, including violent clashes between the Latino and Hasidic communities, Niederman’s willingness to meet at EL Puente’s offices and to do so alone was a pivotal symbolic gesture. EL Puente
leaders greeted him with a sincere outpouring of affection, according to Acosta, because of the symbolism of the gesture. Acosta characterized it as being “like Nixon coming to China.” Niederman responded positively to the reception and agreed to participate in a community hearing on Radiac. It was this May 1991 meeting, which fortuitously preceded Dinkins September 1991 announcement on the incinerator, which formed the foundation for the CAFE coalition.

Around this time, NYPIRG had also been trying to organize communities to oppose the incinerator plan and came to El Puente to seek its participation in the fight. El Puente’s leadership responded that it would only participate if it were a community-led effort. This was important to El Puente because it wanted to ensure that the community was not used as a constituency tool for any group that would then negotiate with the City and State without community input. NYPIRG agreed to the terms.

The work that El Puente and the community had done around education was an important base for its environmental justice work. United Parents to Save Our Children now had churches and other institutions on their side.

A key component to the formulation of the coalition was to define their unifying principles. It took months for them to create their core principles – which they ultimately called the “Principles of Unity.” The principles constituted an important set of understandings to promote the multi-racial work. For example, there was an African American minister, along with the Hasidim, who opposed a principle of gender equality. The group had to work hard to get them to accept that principle. But in the end, they did. Principles of Unity articulated why the group had come together, what its shared understanding was and provided it with guidelines for a process of joint work.

This arduous foundation laying work became important because the battle over the incinerator spanned many years and required constant strategic shifts, and constant capitalizing off of different respective strengths of the participating groups.

The incinerator battle pitted the low income communities and a statewide advocacy group against the Mayor’s office, Wall Street, which would benefit from the bond issues necessary to pay for the construction of the project, unions who wanted the construction jobs the project would produce, and the New York Times, which took a pro-incinerator editorial stance.

The previous work of El Puente and other local leaders in the Latino and African American communities contributed to their capacity to organize and prepare a response to the incinerator crisis. There was an authentic constituency base from which to organize. Unlike the Latino population, which had a relatively small electorate, the Satmars, though generally low income, were a relatively powerful voting block. The hierarchical nature of the sect ensures that its leaders can produce large blocks of votes for the candidates they endorse. They had supported Dinkins in his 1989 mayoral race because of his opposition to the incinerator. The Satmars were willing to use this political clout. NYPIRG possessed research and state-level lobbying capacity and expertise.
Importantly, the multiracial character of the coalition, particularly with the participation of Latinos, African Americans and the Hasidim, was a tremendous political strength given the history of conflict in Williamsburg, and the continuing conflict occurring in Crown Heights. The symbolic power of the coalition garnered media and political attention. The coalition used these strengths well throughout their struggle.

The coalition created a unifying language to describe the incinerator project, as well as processes for inclusion of all constituents in strategy. It also responded in very strategic ways to the continuing shifts in the political climate and the change of venue for the battles.

Dinkins’ announcement of the reversal of his anti-incinerator position came just two weeks before the New York State legislative hearing on environmental racism. The three groups immediately held a press conference denouncing the incinerator as one more environmental insult dumped on a low income minority community. The Chair of the NYPIRG board, who was African American, analogized the incinerator decision to the Kerner Commission report detailing the nation’s move toward a separate and unequal one. The press conference helped to bring a flurry of other activity and the Ft. Greene/Clinton Hill neighborhood, which was predominantly African American and bordered the opposite side of the Navy Yard, held a public meeting to denounce the project. Both the Brooklyn and Manhattan Borough Presidents came to support the meeting. More such meetings were held around the city, including in the predominantly African American Farrugut and Fort Greene Housing Projects. African American religious leaders came out in force against the project. The African American ministers became a part of the alliance against the incinerator.

The first tactical victory of this larger alliance was getting legislation passed which required the City Council to approve the city’s solid waste management plan. Construction on the incinerator was scheduled to begin in 1994, just after Dinkins’ bid for reelection. In March 1992, the administration, therefore, announced that it would postpone construction until 1996, in an apparent effort to remove the controversy from the reelection campaign.

CAFE, however, did not slow down its opposition work. El Puente and its affiliated coalition, United Parents to Save Our Children, the UJO and NYPIRG planned an April 1992 summit, held at PS 16. They provided transportation to help get people there, and over 1,200 community residents attended. Politicians were allowed to attend, but were not allowed to speak. The groups did not want this important organizing event to be hijacked by politicians. Speakers from different segments of the community, Latino, African American, Hasidic, etc., talked about the different environmental problems and how those problems were tied to the incinerator. The summit ended with a pledge by the entire group to participate in a community alliance, which became CAFE.

Despite the opposition from his political base to the incinerator proposal, Dinkins did not return to his pro-recycling, anti-incinerator stance. Instead, his administration modified the plan to close down two smaller incinerators, upgrade a third and increase
recycling in exchange for City Council votes for the Navy Yard incinerator project. This compromise with the City Council led to the coalition’s first stunning defeat. Despite CAFÉ’s getting nearly 800 children of multiple ethnic backgrounds in attendance at the City Council meeting, it voted to approve the incinerator proposal, late at night, after the community members had returned home on the promise that no action would be taken that day.

CAFÉ shifted its battle ground from the City Council to the State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), which had the authority to approve permits for the project. At this point, the coalition confronted its first major internal conflict. At the group’s September 1992 strategy meeting NYPIRG suggested that they march from Brooklyn to Manhattan across the Brooklyn Bridge. Both Niederman and Acosta supported the idea. But Latino housing activists at the meeting opposed it. A few months before this meeting the Latino housing advocacy community had a major fight with the Hasidim over who would get apartments in three housing projects. A 1991 consent decree placed 190 African American and Latino families at the top of the waiting list for the housing. This consent decree probably had aided coalitional efforts because it eased tensions around the Hasidim over-representation in public housing. It was 40% of the population but held 68% of public housing units in the neighborhood. In May 1992, however, the battle resurfaced when the Latino community discovered that the UJO had applied for an $810,000 grant from the US Housing and Urban Development to study the feasibility of turning 1,102 apartments in two of the projects into tenant-owned coops. Latino housing advocates saw the move as an attempt to circumvent the consent decree. Niederman offered to resubmit the proposal as a joint submission with the Latino community, which the Latino advocates rejected.

Housing advocates were also concerned that the Latino community might not receive the credit it would deserve for its participation in the march, thereby weakening its clout while the Hasidim strengthened its own clout. This might impact whether Latinos would get their fair share of housing, jobs and other services if they won the Navy Yard victory and it was slated for other forms of development.

Acosta, who had been able to put aside other community disputes with the UJO for purposes of the anti-incinerator work, was now in a difficult position. He ultimately joined the other Latino leaders on the grounds that the march would lessen the chances of maintaining a long-term coalition. They deferred plans for the march and NYPIRG and Brooklyn Legal Services (BLSC) worked with the Latino housing advocates to build trust with the Hasidim and overcome their reservations about the March. Importantly, BLSC had relationships with both the Latino housing advocates and the UJO because it had represented both organizations on housing issues and had a good relationship with both. This intervention emphasizes the important role of external organizations in community-based struggles, providing political guidance, technical support and assistance.

Eventually the march was held the following January 1993 on Martin Luther King Day. A message of racial unity gave it a moral high ground in the public debate and made
it an important political symbol in a city roiling from the Crown Heights conflict between Afro-Caribbeans and the Hasidim. No politician wanted to be seen as undermining the unity existing between Latinos, African Americans and Hasidim.

In the meantime, the coalition had to devise new tactics because the city was pushing the state to approve the incinerator permit before November 15, 1992, when the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act would apply to the issuance of the permit. CAFE had to find ways to prevent the state from issuing the permits before that date. It was at this stage of the struggle that CAFE was formally named. It is important to note that it included the African American Ft. Greene community and its ministers, not just El Puente, the UJO and NYPIRG.

Coalition tactics at this stage largely centered on a public relations campaign challenging the process by which the state was considering approval of the permits. This included a federal lawsuit and public messaging about “railroading” the permit process by departing from regular procedure to accelerate the decision-making process. Within days of the lawsuit, DEC agreed not to issue any permits before the November 1992 effective date of the Clean Air Act Amendments. But soon after this victory, the coalition was handed a defeat. A DEC Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Clean Air Act requirements did not apply to the Williamsburg incinerator project.

The UJO’s attorney announced that it would appeal the ruling based on the discovery that the incinerator would sit on top of the graves of Revolutionary War prisoners. The anti-incinerator coalition now had a vehicle to broaden opposition to the incinerator by galvanizing Veterans groups, Daughters of the American Revolution and historical preservation groups. CAFE sponsored a march with these organizations to get public attention to this new twist in the fight, but made the strategic decision to allow the new organizations to take center stage, ensuring their greater participation in an alliance effort and heightening the public attention to the burial ground issue by not having “the usual suspects” at the public helm of the event.

CAFE used the months of waiting for the DEC appeal ruling to press the DEC to hold a public hearing in Williamsburg on the incinerator. The community had additional public relations ammunition against the DEC for its refusal to hear the community’s concerns as part of its decision-making process. It pressed for state legislation to force the application of the Clean Air Act amendments to the incinerator permit request. In July 1993 Governor Cuomo helped negotiate a compromise that would partially exempt the incinerator from the Clean Air Act requirements, and require the city to study the health effects of the project on surrounding communities prior to a DEC decision on the incinerator permit. This compromise meant that the incinerator project was tied up.

Dinkins lost his reelection bid to Giuliani, who had softened his pro-incinerator stance to one of support only if recycling would not be financially feasible. After the Giuliani administration began to open up the possibility of the demise of the incinerator plan, the incinerator developer, Wheelabrator Environmental Systems, began an active
lobbying campaign for the permits. Giuliani reversed his position, as Dinkins had done, and supported the incinerator project.

But in April 1994, in yet another plot twist in this lengthy saga, high levels of toxic chemicals were found in soil samples at the Navy Yard. The DEC had learned this in 1992 and the City Sanitation Department claimed that it had not been informed. Once again the coalition saw an opportunity to exploit government misfeasance or malfeasance to attack the project. This raised the question of whether the Navy Yard should be assigned to the Superfund program. It later turned out that the City Sanitation Department had learned of the toxicity at the Navy Yard in 1988 and had not informed the DEC.

This created another significant loss of momentum for pro-incinerator forces. In June 1996, New York’s Governor Pataki, signed legislation formally closing the Fresh Kills landfill and simultaneously barring the operation of a garbage-burning incinerator at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. This legislation imposed a change in direction for New York City’s solid waste program. After five years, CAFE had a total victory.

CAFE worked together in other ways. Through CAFE the community dealt with problems related to the Hsomim Patrol. They got the 90th precinct to have pictures taken of all members of the Hsomim patrol, so that any victims of abuse could identify their abusers. Together, through CAFE the community examined the problem of asthma. They conducted a 5000-person survey and got a peer review article published in the American Journal of Public Health. They got funding to work together on an asthma initiative that just ended last year.

4. Analysis

As Shaw notes in his extensive case study of CAFE its success in the fight against the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator occurred because of its staying power. It won a war of attrition against wealthy, powerful business interests, a local government intent on the incinerator project, a state government inclined to do the bidding of business interests, and favorable media. In Shaw’s view, “The coalition’s ability to delay for so long…is one of the great social change success stories of the past decade.”

The reasons this coalition of unlikely partners was able to form in the first place are threefold: (1) long-standing, respected institutions with real constituencies in the Latino and Hasidic communities, coupled with (2) institutional leaders with the vision and courage to identify the benefits of working together and then to make it happen and (3) the right issue on which the groups could unify – their shared environment – despite lacking agreement on other important neighborhood issues, including jobs and housing or requiring a shared ideology. As Acosta stated in the interview for this case study, “El Puente talks to everyone.” His strategic sense and willingness to talk to everyone was key to establishing important ties to all segments of the community. Likewise, Rabbi

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146 Id Shaw at 103.
148 Id. at 103.
Niederman’s willingness to talk to El Puente was also a necessary and pivotal event for the formation of the coalition, despite it costing him some political capital in his own community.

As Shaw points out, that each community-based group had a true constituency base meant that neither group could accuse the other of using the other’s constituency base for its own ends—a common concern Shaw finds for groups considering the costs of coalition.\textsuperscript{148} For example, often community groups feel used by state or national groups who wish to set the agenda and use a groups’ constituency for legislative legitimacy. NYPIRG did not do this. Rather, NYPIRG’s willingness and foresight to allow community control of the decision-making process fostered trust with community groups, and therefore provided the opportunity for community groups to benefit from its capacity and resources, including research, lobbying and litigation capacities.

Maintenance of the coalitional efforts required several more conditions. Garden Acosta emphasized the coalitional work done to build trust among the organizations, to respect for everyone's culture, and to create a strong sense of unity (which required legitimate leaders who were supported by their constituencies). This trust, culture of respect and unity were not precursive but had to be built through a deliberate process. The coalition’s attention to a process of creating principles of unity and fighting through some difficult ideological tensions, including gender equality, shows that while they did not require a shared ideology to begin work, they had to have an agreement of a working ideology for their joint work, which did not have to apply outside of the coalitional efforts. Thus, coalitional relationships are not static, and the longevity of CAFE was upheld by the development of a shared, albeit limited ideology, for the purpose of continuing the work.

The leadership also had to respond quickly and strategically to a rapidly changing environment, including conflicts arising between constituencies unrelated to the incinerator fight, such as the housing development crisis that occurred in 1992. Outside resources, including legal expertise and relationships with Brooklyn Legal Services was also valuable in addressing tensions.

Shaw refers to the CAFE coalition as a temporary entity. While it is true that it was not formed to exist forever, it is clear that Acosta and Niederman hoped to build a long-term relationship that would result in joint work for a long time to come. Indeed, the broad CAFE coalition that included NYPIRG and Ft. Greene churches, and, later, an alliance with veterans and preservation groups was centered on the incinerator fight. One of the important successes of the coalition, however, is that El Puente and the UJO continued to work in coalition for some time, including their joint grant-writing and project work on asthma in the neighborhood. Therefore, the coalition is more properly defined as a fluid one that was defined and redefined during and after the incinerator fight.

\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 105.
The relationship between Acosta and Niederman remains strong. But it would be inaccurate to describe the organizational relationships as ongoing. Niederman has experienced negative consequences for his participation in CAFÉ and he has constituents who are angry about his on-going relationship with El Puente. If Niederman were to lose his leadership position in the UJO, it would be a significant blow to the lines of communication now established through their joint efforts. As a result, both Niederman and Acosta have been forced to define limitations to the work they can do together.

The coalition has been inactive for the last year. The structural issues that have produced conflict between the groups historically – housing and the community identity it carries, have intensified, making it difficult to continue working together. According to Acosta, the Hasidim had been buying up real estate increasingly in the Latino section of the neighborhood, and as landlords they have been accused of discrimination against non-Hasids. The Latino community has witnessed a pattern of conversion of commercial space to housing and a refusal to rent to anyone outside “their community.” El Puente has experienced this discrimination directly. El Puente had been trying to buy a building on the block in which they are currently located to expand their space. They had a contract to buy the building with the Hasidic owners, who reneged on the contract when they realized that El Puente was the buyer. Niederman has little influence over the sellers.

The Latino population has declined somewhat and there are serious questions about the long-term racial balance of the neighborhood. As a result, Acosta drew a line in the sand. He told Niederman that in order for their joint work to continue, the Hasidim had to agree not to cross Broadway. (Broadway is a major thoroughfare that has historically divided the Hasidic part of the neighborhood from the Latino side).

El Puente is still continuing to increase its relationships with all racial and ethnic segments of the neighborhood. It is now working with neighborhood new-comers (White gentrifiers) to build a relationship around preserving the richness of the multi-ethnic community.

C. LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN ALLIANCE

As discussed earlier, Sonenshein, has written extensively on multi-racial politics in Los Angeles. He concludes that there are three prerequisites for building multi-racial political coalitions there. They are: 1) similar ideologies, 2) common interests, and 3) strong personal leadership ties to preserve coalitions.\(^{149}\)

While finding Sonenshein’s three prerequisites important, Jones-Correa, points out that political actors’ weigh costs and benefits differently when considering coalition building and the changing structural makeup of the city. He stresses that changing structural arrangements in Los Angeles impede cooperation between actors that share similar ideologies. Looking at the city council in Los Angeles, Jones-Correa concludes

\(^{149}\) Raphael J, Sonenshein, Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles (1993), P. 246 - 257
that the downturn in the economy, the shrinking of the local tax base and the rapid change in population, coupled with the shortened term-limits of the city council, reinforces the “fiefdom” mentality – territoriality and ethnic protectiveness. The fight for limited resources and the political structure encourages responsiveness to racial politics rather than long-range benefits of ethnic coalitions.  

Jones-Correa finds that Los Angeles neighborhood service providers and community organizations have had an equally difficult time building coalitions. Many service providers and community-based organizations, he notes, grew out of the 1965 Watts riots and were responding to a predominantly African American community. Those same organizations are now confronted with a primarily Latino clientele, and many have found it difficult to adjust to this new demographic reality.

Jones-Correa concludes that many neighborhood service providers have failed to diversify their boards and personnel to reflect the population they are serving. He identifies a perception of a zero sum loss in the context of hard won African American institutional presence and job opportunities. Jones Correa also notes that while African American community organizations perceive themselves as “under siege” by Latinos, there are few if any Latino organizations emerging in the traditionally Black communities. The result, says Jones Correa, is a conservative grassroots level politics, despite common issues of interest. 

Jones-Correa notes that the civil rights community has engaged in ethnic coalition building because of a shared ideology of inclusiveness, because there are few material interests at risk between stakeholders and because of long standing relationships between civil rights leaders. He concludes that strengths of the civil rights community in ethnic coalition building also reflect the weaknesses in its capacity to generate political will. Without material resources and connection to the city’s political structure, the civil rights community is limited in its capacity to change the structural arrangements of the city.

A limitation in Jones-Correa’s analysis is the lack of definition, or solid examples of Los Angeles’ civil rights community. He cites only churches and synagogues as examples. Therefore, more evidence is necessary to evaluate the capacity of the civil rights community to affect political structures, either within the community or in conjunction with other types of organizations. .

1. Structural context and community relations history
Biracial and multiracial conflict and coalition in Los Angeles can only be understood in the context of the structure of politics, economy and geography. Sonenshein and Jones-Correa identify four structural shifts which have contributed to

151 Ibid. P. 204-205.
152 Ibid P. 205-206
racial and ethnic tensions in cities: 1) rapid ethnic diversification of the cities due to immigration; 2) middle class flight from cities; 3) economic restructuring of manufacturing to service jobs and its impact on low income intra-ethnic/racial job competition; and 4) the reduction in federal financial support of cities. Many interviewed for this case study made similar observations:

- Disparities in community resource allocation;
- Economic instability in certain neighborhoods with different income classes of ethnic groups;\(^{153}\)
- Competition for low-income housing, where landlords want to rent to immigrants because they are perceived as not seeking redress of grievances, as compared to African-Americans.

In addition other demographic changes and structural barriers add to ethnic conflict including the depopulation of African Americans in the city, county and state, increasing African American unemployment and Latino demand for school and hospital jobs, held disproportionately by non-Hispanic whites. The spatial structure of Los Angeles and its vicinity also contributes to inter-ethnic tensions, as many communities of color are moving into unincorporated suburban areas that lack political representation and have difficulty competing for Los Angeles County resources.

a. Demographics and Employment

Los Angeles is a city that has always been multi-racial, but has had significant and rapid ethnic demographic shifts in the twentieth century – with major African American and Jewish in-migration around the World War II era, and major growth in the Latino population between 1980 and today. These demographic shifts are related to economic changes. Industrialization in the middle of the century accounted for African American population growth as Southern Blacks were attracted to the city by factory jobs. These jobs also contributed to the creation of a Black middle-class. The later quarter of the century has seen the shift of the manufacturing economy to the globalization of the economy and the resulting growth in service sector jobs, which are lower waged and non-unionized.

While Jones-Correa has identified public sector job competition as a particular problem, during the Mayoral administration of Tom Bradley, the first and only African American mayor of LA, Latinos and Asians did benefit in terms of their representation in the city’s workforce. As in New York City, Latinos and Asians were the primary beneficiaries of the shift, doubling their numbers in city jobs over this twenty-year period. The Latino city workforce grew from just over 9% in 1973 to almost 20% in 1993, while Asians increased their numbers from 4% to 7.5%.\(^{154}\)

\(^{153}\) e.g., the 10th City Council district, which is historically African-American and now home to 80% of Koreatown – Koreans are solidly middle class business owners, lend amongst themselves and attract capital, but African-Americans may not benefit

Recently Los Angeles Latinos employed in the public sector represent only a small percentage of all employed Latinos. It is estimated that in 2001 the proportion of the employed African American population represented in government employment was 22.5%, while only 5.5% of the employed Latino population was represented in the government sector. Of the employed white population, 7.3% were represented in government jobs. The small representation of Latinos in government jobs is in part due to increased Latino immigration of non-naturalized citizens.

b. Effective Voice

Politically, Los Angeles has been described as an historically non-partisan city with almost no political organizations. It has also been described as a city with many “politics…existing in various layers that often have little to do with one another.” Jones Correa found that the political structure of Los Angeles encourages minimal government and privatization of community efforts, rather than the channeling efforts through public systems. Government does not take a direct role in ameliorating community problems and community based groups do not interact significantly with government. This is a markedly different structure from that of New York’s local government.

Structural arrangements encourage this limited interaction. Unlike the New York City Council, Los Angeles City Council members do not have a pool of funds to use as they wish to fund community projects. New York City community organizations receive significantly more funding through state service contracts, which are disbursed through the city’s borough party organizations. In Los Angeles, state funds are distributed through the County Board of Supervisors, a five-member body. As a result of the financial structural arrangement that disconnects community-based organizations (CBOs) from the city council, CBOs are more independent and capable in mediating the city’s feuding factions, but wield little leverage in city politics.

Historically, Los Angeles politics was dominated by White Protestant business elites. According to Sonenshein, during the first half of the twentieth century White Protestants held a homogeneous community ideal that excluded African Americans, Mexicans and Jews from city politics. The World War II industrialization of Los Angeles (including aircraft production) drew African Americans from the South for higher paying jobs. The Jewish community also grew before and during the World War II period. Jewish, residents settled primarily in West LA, and because of exclusionary

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156: 183 – 195; Raphael Sonenshein, Post-Incorporation Politics in Los Angeles, in BIRACIAL POLITICS, P 43.
158: Id.
159: Id. at 202.
practices of the White Protestant business leaders, built their own economic power centers outside of the downtown business center.\textsuperscript{160}

Therefore, in the political geography of the city, African Americans and Jews were both “out-groups.” They shared a liberal ideology and developed strong trusting leadership relationships, especially during the 1960’s civil rights movement. Shared ideology, shared interest and leadership relationships led to the first significant biracial coalition of twentieth century Los Angeles – an African American and Jewish political coalition created to elect Tom Bradley, an African American to the city council in 1963 (remarkably in a district only one-third African American), and to the Mayors office in 1973. Bradley was also the first African American mayor of the city. This political coalition would last for twenty years. The importance of the Bradley administration and the biracial political coalition that supported it led to a significant incorporation of African Americans and Jews into governmental structures, including significant gains in city council representation.\textsuperscript{161} The African-American-Jewish political coalition, as long-lived as it was, has not remained a permanent fixture in city politics.

Though Latinos were not a formal part of the Bradley political coalition, they did vote for him in large numbers in 1973 and in his reelections. Bradley appointed several Latinos to commission posts, but it was 12 years before any Latino was elected to the city council. Asian-Americans also made electoral gains through appointments for city commissioner and Bradley’s veto of the city council’s plan that would have eliminated the city’s only Asian American district, that of Michael Woo.

Eventually Latino and Asian American political leaders became dissatisfied with their junior positions in the coalition. Latinos, in particular, vacillated between remaining a part of the multiracial Bradley coalition and seeking to “go it alone.” In the 1993 mayoral election, Latinos split their vote, arguably leading to the success of the conservative white-led coalition.

Sonenshein also points out that the split was related to the affluent status of the biracial coalition. By the early 1990s, both inner city African Americans and Latinos were increasingly alienated from the coalition. Bradley had pursued an economic policy of downtown revitalization while many poor communities continued to deteriorate. Bradley worked on community-based development only toward the end of his twenty years in office. At the community level, Bradley’s contribution to city work force integration was overshadowed by his neglect of community-based development.

According to Sonenshein, the competition between African Americans and Latinos for jobs, particularly in construction, and competition between African American residents and Korean store owners in South Los Angeles became more pressing than Black/white issues.\textsuperscript{162} African American/Latino competition and conflict became more

\textsuperscript{160} 183 – 195; Raphael Sonenshein, Post-Incorporation Politics in Los Angeles, in BIRACIAL POLITICS, P. 43 - 45
\textsuperscript{161} Id. at 44.
\textsuperscript{162} Id. at 255.
apparent in the employment and political realms. Immigrant Latinos in South Central had high levels of employment, lack of citizenship status, and were employed in low paid, non-unionized service sector jobs. For post World War II African Americans who migrated to Los Angeles from the South, the relatively well-paying factory jobs helped sustain their political activism, an advantage that the new Latino immigrants lack.

The restructuring of the economy from manufacturing to service jobs exacerbated African American-Latino-Asian tensions and conflict including competition over job contracts and city resources. Latino political disenfranchisement, due to citizenship status and immigration policy also fuels the tensions between the groups.

White political power also adds to tensions between communities of color, benefiting from divisions between African Americans and Latinos. Gary Delgado of The Applied Research Center (ARC) found racial divisiveness in the 2000 Los Angeles mayoral race between Villaraigosa, the Latino candidate backed by a multiracial constituency, and Hahn, a white centrist candidate who won the race, in part, by playing on racialized sentiments and fears.\textsuperscript{163} ARC found that the black/brown power struggle for political control played a key role in impeding wider multiracial cooperation that could have elected Villaraigosa. \textsuperscript{164} ARC further found that Hahn’s garner of black votes was due in substantial part to this black/brown tension because Hahn had helped Black politicians hold onto their power in the face of an increasing Latino population.

Importantly, there are also positive examples of political behavior that demonstrate that structural barriers are not insurmountable. Richard Riordan’s break of the democratic hold on the city that had been taken for granted during the Bradley years, occurred because of shifts of the Jewish liberal vote from the 5th council district (Bradley’s former stronghold) and a less energized Latino electorate. But his opponent, Michael Woo, the first Asian American elected to the City Council, won 86% of the African American vote, despite the fact that the previous year had witnessed incredible ethnic tensions between African Americans and Korean store owners.

In another positive moment for electoral collaboration between Blacks and Latinos in 1995, they overcame “zero sum” barriers to political cooperation, using reapportionment to build reciprocity among different racial group constituencies. African American and Latino political leaders, after months of debate, resolved their disagreements by ensuring that neither constituency would lose legislative seats through redistricting.

Sonenshein states that the end of the biracial political coalition between African Americans and Jews has meant that issues of non-white communities have been “seriously fragmented.” He states:

\textsuperscript{164} Id. at 51.
At one time, the city’s warring factions were divided clearly into two main groups: those who sided with minorities against those who were unfriendly to minorities. That is no longer the case. The issues that once defined minority progress were well known: affirmative action in city hiring, the obtaining of federal funds, and police accountability. Nothing like that clarity exists in today’s Los Angeles, where the old biracial alliance shares space with angry white conservatives, assertive minorities, and the often inchoate demands of the urban poor.¹⁶⁵

Structurally, global economic changes that prompt intra-group job competition, changes in city council term limits, the disconnect between government resources the city council and neighborhood organizations, and immigration policy make conflict a potential obstacle for multi-racial coalitions and their attempt to formulate an “effective voice.”

c. Non-Electoral Multi-racial Coalitions

Los Angeles currently has many multi-racial coalitions, including the Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (Community Coalition) and Coalition LA. Coalition LA works on community-based organizing with a focus on impacting electoral politics from a strategy of community empowerment. The LA Alliance for a New Economy, which is a coalition with organized labor at its core, includes religious organizations and elected officials. It focuses on living wage campaigns in the region and other economic development issues. It does not organize at a community level. All these coalitions work together formally and informally at various times.

The Jobs With Peace coalition is an historic example of multi-racial organizing work in LA, and a precursor to current relationships. In 1984 it created a coalition of labor, political organizations and community-based organizations fighting to get the LA city council to do an analysis of investment in non-peace jobs (aerospace industry) and its costs on the social safety net and jobs in the “peace” sector. It was a successful short-term initiative, in that it resulted in a city council study, but it was not a long-term coalition and did not create any long-term policy changes.

Some interviewees view the work of the Met Alliance as a direct outgrowth of Jobs with Peace, because the Jobs With Peace working relationships translated into coalitions to fight the anti-immigrant Proposition 106 and the anti-affirmative action Proposition 209. They also believe that the current coalitions in LA came about because of long-standing relationships between the leaders of many of the organizations who are current players in the Met Alliance.

Serious city conflicts in the early 1990’s did not prevent attempts at collaborative approaches to community problems. After the ’92 riots, the Community Coalition pushed for a moratorium on rebuilding liquor stores in South LA, as a response to alcohol

¹⁶⁵ See, supra note 156, at 58.
abuse in the community. The Community Coalition worked to build ties to the Korean liquor store owners and develop, as part of its strategy, a way to find them other commercial opportunities. Though unsuccessful, the movement did attempt to include Korean interests as an explicit part of the vision, analysis and actions.

Michelle Pritchard, an interviewee associated with the Liberty Hill Foundation and a long-time observer of multi-racial coalitions, sees important distinctions in Los Angeles’ history from those of the Northeast or Midwest as contributing to its history of multiracial collaboration. Specifically, as a newer city, Los Angeles traditionally has had very weak left-leaning institutional structures. Unions, for example, were historically much weaker in LA than their Northeastern or Midwestern counterparts and it never had organizing training centers like the Center for Third World Organizing in Oakland or the Northwest Academy in Chicago. This history meant that people had to experiment “to figure it out.” There were not entrenched interests. Pritchard also points out that LA’s geography and demographics are so sprawling that there is room for many organizations to work with little competition.

d. South Los Angeles

South Los Angeles, formerly known as South Central, is both the locus of formation of the Met Alliance and much of Los Angeles’ most notorious conflict between African Americans, Latinos and Koreans. Therefore, it is important to understand the history and context of South Los Angeles.

Historically, South Los Angeles was predominantly African American. In 1970 it was 77% African American. However, by 2000, the number of African Americans living in the neighborhood dropped by almost 40 percentage points to just over 37.5% of the neighborhood’s population. The Latino population grew, during this same thirty-year period, from just under 10% of the population to over 56% of the population. Non-Hispanic White neighborhood residents decreased from a low 9% of the population in 1970 to a mere 2.5% of the population in 2000. Not surprisingly, as a result of largely Latino in-migration, the percentage of foreign-born residents increased from just 6.55% of the 1970 population to more than a third (almost 37%) of the population. South Los Angeles is also home to people of other races, about 3.5% of the population, including a significant number of people who claimed more than one race, and a small Asian population.

The rapidly changing South Los Angeles population is related to global shifts in the economy and has put stress on community institutions. Global economic restructuring affects the changing job structure of South Los Angeles and helps establish an environment where job competition exists between Latinos and African Americans.

As Jones-Correa notes, there is research to support that job competition exists amongst low income African Americans and Latinos. The Black unemployment rate in

166 Pritchard pointed out that even the more conservative elements of the City were not interlocked (Hollywood and the Agriculture, Military/aerospace industries).
167 1990 and 2000 Census Bureau, Geolytics.
South LA was 16.15% for women and 20.13% for men in 2000. African American men experienced the highest unemployment rate of all racial and ethnic residents. The unemployment rates for both African American men and women have increased since 1980, by 6.24 and 5.54 percentage points respectively.

The Latino unemployment rate was also high, albeit lower than African Americans’. Latino male unemployment in 2000 was 10.27%. Latino male unemployment has remained fairly stable since 1980, when it was 9.61%. Latina women experience much higher unemployment than their male counterparts. In 2000, Latina South Central residents’ unemployment rate was 15.79%, similar to the black female unemployment rates.

Income, as well as employment, is important when assessing the structure of the economy in South Los Angeles. For African American residents per capita incomes are low, but much higher than those of their Latino neighbors. In 2000 African American per capita income was $14,181, compared to Latino per capita income of $7,445 in South LA. The overall high unemployment rates in Los Angeles in conjunction with the restructuring of the economy have the potential to create institutional friction between Blacks and Latinos in South Los Angeles. Per Capita income differences, may be explained by differing household sizes, but may also reflect wage differences of the declining higher-wage manufacturing economy accessed by African Americans and the growing lower wage service economy where most Latinos are represented.

2. History of the coalition, its structure and work

The Los Angeles Metropolitan Alliance is a uniquely structured coalition. It shares the characteristics of a “multiracial issue-based coalition” and a “multiracial network,” as defined by Delgado. It is multiethnic (largely Latino and Black with some Asian representation), has a relatively formal structure with staff, a steering committee and a membership structure. It is unique as it was conceived and anchored in a community-based organization, while having a vast membership list of city-wide organizations. The array of participating institutions include, labor unions, religious institutions, service providers and community-organizations. In some instances, the primary participation in the coalition comes from the leader of a member organization and in other instances member organization staff are more wholly involved in the work. The Met Alliance contains member organizations that are themselves coalitions. This is not so unusual as noted in the CAFE case study. Less common is the organizing that occurs within the Alliance’s own multiracial neighborhood-based organizations.

In order to understand the history of the Met Alliance, it is important to understand the history and vision behind AGENDA, the community-based organization at the center of the Met Alliance. Anthony Thigpenn, a long-time South LA activist, along with a handful of other activists, founded AGENDA in 1992 on the heels of the Los Angeles uprisings. Thigpenn and other long-time community activists wanted to address the root causes of economic disparity in South LA and create long-term solutions.
Thigpenn was already a respected leader in the community, having been active in South LA since the early ’70s. He has organized around issues of police brutality and has assisted the election of a progressive candidate to the State Assembly. He and the other founders wanted to build a vehicle for developing and winning proactive agendas, which they believed had to include strategic, multi-racial alliances.

From its inception, the vision for this community-based work was based on multi-racial coalition building. First a community base needed to be built. The African American community base was organized first because African American institutions were more numerous and established than newer Latino institutions. “African-Americans were more organized and active,” according to Elsa Barboza. At that time, South Central was just over half African-American. Now it is just over half Latino and that segment of the community is growing. When AGENDA organized in the African-American segment of the community, it trained its members to look at the larger landscape and develop an analysis that showed that Latinos and African-Americans were similarly situated. AGENDA’s first activities focused on police accountability, economic development of vacant lots and later work to defeat the infamous anti-affirmative action proposition 209.

Once established in the African American community, the group began organizing the Latino segment of the community. AGENDA began to include Latinos in the organization with inclusive decision-making meetings with African-Americans, but also convened separate meetings with Latino members to develop the same common-issue analysis in a way that was not threatening to Latino interests.

By the mid-’90s, AGENDA began talking formally with other allied organizations about forming a metropolitan coalition, which had always been part of AGENDA’s long-term reform strategy. It had been working with other groups in coalition, but the coalitions were ad hoc. AGENDA was raising the idea of a standing multi-racial coalition based on common interests among groups to work toward strategic reforms. Organizational leaders agreed that they wanted to work together for long-term solutions and began attending AGENDA meetings and sessions.

The Met Alliance spent almost a year conducting strategy sessions to determine some of the preliminary issues and strategies the coalition would pursue. Part of this process included discussions with community members about their needs and priorities and the need for jobs kept surfacing as the priority concern. AGENDA did initial research on problems, conditions and trends. Later the coalition divided up research assignments and eventually decided to work together on their first campaigns for the coalition, the Dreamworks and welfare-to-work campaigns – both of which addressed the employment needs.

Regarding welfare, organizations were really concerned about what would happen with devolution and workfare. In South LA alone 250,000 people were on public assistance. The numbers were huge and no one really knew what the impact of the new policies would be. They were conscious from the beginning about forging relationships between welfare recipients and county workers, since there was a tension around
workfare participants displacing the union workforce and undermining wages. They focused on what their response would be and how to win concessions. That research was conducting internally at AGENDA, but organized labor, City Council deputy staff members and organizers all participated in the research. The welfare campaign had three components:

- City jobs for recipients;
- Community/Labor oversight of implementation plan of the city of Los Angeles’ Workforce Investment program. Policy principles (e.g., full-time jobs paying living wage with benefits and a bar on forcing recipients into non-paid community service jobs.)

Ultimately, the welfare campaign led to the Alliance’s creation of a “Jobs in Healthcare” campaign, which is ongoing. The Alliance conducted research to identify the sector with the most job growth and good living wages and benefits in Los Angeles. The research resulted in the identification of health care industry jobs. The number of health care sector jobs has been increasing and there is not a sufficient trained workforce to meet employers’ needs.

The Met Alliance developed a model jobs program, hiring consultants to help design it. The program created a city sponsored health-care industry job training/placement program for welfare recipients and other low-skilled poor people. The health care job program has a 250-person capacity, less than the 1,000 the Alliance sought. Budget cuts have also impacted the scope of the program. The first class of trainees has begun graduation and placement. The Alliance is monitoring the program, fighting annually for its appropriations and trying to boost the program to its originally planned scale.

The Dreamworks campaign was more technical in nature because of the land use and subsidy structure issues. The Met Alliance hired part-time researchers (graduate students) to assist the staff in the research behind the Dreamworks campaign. The Legal Aid Society also helped develop a coalitional understanding of the subsidy structure, as did the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE).

It is important to understand the broader organizational structure of Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE), of which the Met Alliance is one participating organization, to understand Thigpenn’s vision of producing policy reform. SCOPE is the umbrella organization for four other entities, which fall under SCOPE’s tax exempt status: 1) AGENDA; 2) CIPHER; 3) the Environmental & Economic Justice Project and 4) the Met Alliance. Anthony Thigpenn is the President of SCOPE.

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169 Thigpenn is commonly identified, mistakenly, as the Executive Director of the Met Alliance. He holds no formal title or staff position with the Met Alliance. He has played a pivotal leadership role in the Met Alliance, facilitating the Alliance until the past few years. He has ceded much of the leadership now to Barboza and Smith.
The activities and capacity of the organizations involved in SCOPE are as follows:

**AGENDA** – organizes residents of South LA and is a membership-based organization with about 200-300 active members. Because South LA is heavily Latino and African-American, it is a multi-ethnic organization. AGENDA has two full-time and two part-time organizers.

**CIPHER** – is the research arm of SCOPE and the various organizations within it. It conducts applied research, often training community residents to understand problems through their participation in research. CIPHER has three staff members, a director and two research associates.

**The Environmental & Economic Justice Project (EEJP)** creates model programs and tools for popular political education and provides training and technical assistance to help strengthen community organizations. The EEJP engages in these activities across California, not just in Los Angeles, and in other parts of the country. It has three staff members.

**The Met Alliance** – is a regional coalition made up of: a) community residents who are individual members through community-based chapters organized by the staff of the Met Alliance; and 2) like-minded organizations, including labor, immigrant rights, religious and other community-based groups. It is a multi-ethnic alliance consisting of Latino, African-American and some Asian (mostly Korean) individuals and organizations. It lists a total of 25 formal member organizations, in addition to AGENDA, including five Service Employee’s International Union locals, two Korean organizations, three legal organizations, including the Asian Pacific American Legal Center, three neighborhood groups (including AGENDA) and the Southern Christian Leadership Council. It has four staff members, who organize in the chapter communities. It has no formal director or coordinator, so a campaign coordinator, Elsa Barboza, and an organizing director, Sabrina Smith, play those roles both for AGENDA and the Met Alliance.

Some of the organizing staff focus on the neighborhood-based chapter organizing, which include South LA (AGENDA), “SHEP” – Silverlake, Hollywood, Echo Park Metro Alliance chapter (about 150 members) and the West LA Metro Alliance chapter (about 100 members). South LA is Latino and African-American, with Latinos in the majority, but a very large African-American community. SHEP and West LA chapters are heavily Latino, but SHEP has been working to include more of the Filipino population. The organizing staff is racially diverse, their race/ethnicities largely reflecting the communities they are organizing. It works through a steering committee, which also creates ad hoc and standing sub-committees to engage in research, trainings, etc.

In sum, the Met Alliance is a coalition driven not by a large institutional player, but by a relatively small, neighborhood-based organization. It has individual members
through a community chapter structure to provide a strong grassroots empowerment component to its work. Therefore, the Met Alliance has its own constituency. But it also has organizational members from a wide range or sectors.

AGENDA and the Met Alliance use similar analyses to assess issues and similar styles to address conflict between communities with the organizations. Internally, the AGENDA organizing model is explicit about how it develops membership to produce multi-racial work. It helps them develop an analysis that demonstrates the common position of poor people of color. They use a curriculum tool called the “Power Analysis,” which takes an issue or set of concerns and identifies impacts on the communities, identification of the power brokers, community power capacity and strategies to influence key actors. In its community organizing, AGENDA has trained its memberships to conduct their own power analyses, while demonstrating how the same issues members confront affect other African American and Latino communities in greater Los Angeles.

The AGENDA model of organizing is the one used by the Alliance in organizing and developing its community-based chapters. The Silver-Lake/Hollywood/Echo Park (SHEP) and West LA chapters have used the power analysis in membership development. In the SHEP chapter, they have explicitly begun to organize Filipino residents. Most of the SHEP membership base has been Latino, and Filipino participation has not worked well because of their small presence in largely Latino meetings. Organizers are now discussing an approach where they hold separate meetings with Filipino residents and then work through the analysis to solidify their participation before combining the meetings with Latino members. This appears to be a somewhat similar approach to the one AGENDA took in South Central

An early organizational tension that arose in AGENDA’s efforts involved working with unions and the specifically, from the operating differences between unions and community groups. Unions are more bureaucratic and focus on organizing specific work-sites, while engaging in contract negotiations. It was a real shift for unions to engage in internal discussions around larger policy issues that affect member communities. Union staff had to adjust from working for the particular interests of union members to working on broader coalition interests. The shift was accomplished, in large part, from the trust and respect Thigpenn developed between union and community group members.

Tensions also exist between groups within the communities organized by the Met Alliance. One interviewee stated that Latinos were struggling with the barrier to opportunities presented by the lack of legal status faced by Latino immigrants. He stated that the Latino leaders in the Alliance were challenging why legal status was not a core element of the Alliance’s work.

The Met Alliance is currently attempting to formulate an internal and the external policy strategy for the legal rights of undocumented workers. An Immigration Subcommittee was established to keep undocumented Latino members involved in the
Met Alliance and provides education about obtaining citizenship, as well as education about current congressional debates on amnesty.

The Met Alliances’ organizing staff addresses problems that arise in multi-racial organizing as a group, while individual organizers from specific communities have the independence, responsibility and leeway to identify solutions unique to the communities they are organizing. Alliance members also believe that the race and ethnicity of the staff should reflect the communities they are organizing in order to accomplish their goals.

In terms of the coalitional work that includes various ethnically identifiable and multi-racial organizations, the Alliance is explicit about four things:

- Diversity on the steering committee in terms of racial/ethnic and organizational participation, including monolingual Spanish-speaking staff. Shared responsibility for developing and agenda;
- Consensus or near consensus decision-making;
- Simultaneous language translation at all meetings.

Interviewees stated that the Met Alliance admits and confronts conflict between African-Americans and Latinos within the organization, while working hard to build up the same degree of leadership in both communities. It ensures that both African-Americans and Latinos are equally represented in public testimony. Also, the various community-based membership chapters participate in events together, cultural or otherwise, which helps to build the relationships. “They don’t overlook the little things,” according to Victor Nano, a member of the Alliance’s steering committee. The staff makes sure that people sit together and that there is simultaneous translation at cultural events, not just business meetings.

Externally (i.e., in the coalition’s campaign strategies, including goals and public messages), the way the coalition addresses racial/ethnic structural tensions is complex. To elicit this information, interviewees were asked the question: “Strategically, does the coalition frontally and openly discuss race and ethnic institutional discrimination or does it lead with a class analysis without an active discussion of race?” A related question was, “To what degree does the coalitional analysis explicitly address institutionalized racism.” Interviewees answered this question in basically the same way, although with slightly different emphases. They said that race cannot be avoided as an issue because of the demographic differences and disparities in Los Angeles and at times institutional racism is made explicit, depending on the issues in the campaign and its strategy for

170 The press conference I attended had four AGENDA/Alliance members speak – three Latina and one African American. However, there were many African Americans in the room and they participated in the question and answer section of the press conference. The simultaneous translation was not perfect in the question and answer session. The translators were often unable to keep up with all of the important facts being raised by the monolingual Spanish speakers. My observation is that this was due to a lack of adequate coordination about who would do translation in that segment of the press conference. The formal presentations were more effectively translated in my view.
Class drives the analysis of the Met Alliance, according to its two key staff members. The strategy is to eliminate poverty through systemic change. Generally speaking they use a “Mode of Force” Analysis – who is impacted by the corporate agenda and right wing policies and who has potential power. But race is a part of the analysis. How much they talk publicly about race varies from campaign to campaign. The Dreamworks Campaign talked about race explicitly because of the barriers to Hollywood jobs based on discrimination by whites and racial structural barriers to education that South LA residents experience. In another example, the Met Alliance conducted a survey on city hiring which showed that Latinos were hired at lower rates than African-Americans. It reported on this disparity and raised policy issues on structural arrangements negatively impacting Latino hiring, such as definitions of sufficient English proficiency.

3. Analysis
The Met Alliance is a successful multiracial coalition by virtue of its diverse constituency, longevity and programmatic victories in the arena of job training and creation programs. Specifically, it has won the following victories:

1. In 1998, the largest proposed public subsidy ever offered to a corporation was going to DreamWorks Inc. Through a campaign of direct action with both DreamWorks Inc. and the City of Los Angeles, the Alliance convinced DreamWorks to create and provide resources for a Workforce Development Fund that would support multimedia-entertainment training at community college programs for residents of poor, inner-city communities. In addition, DreamWorks and the developers committed to placing participants from training programs in at least 10 percent of the jobs created through the development project. The Alliance was named in the city development agreement as a partner with DreamWorks and the city to develop and monitor these programs. In an example of the power of the campaign, DreamWorks recently decided not to locate on the proposed site, but nevertheless agreed to honor its commitment to the Workforce Development Fund and job access agreements, including providing an initial $5 million to get the programs started.

2. The "Work First" implementation of welfare reform was placing workers in poverty-wage jobs. The Alliance developed and won adoption from the City of Los Angeles and the Private Industry Council of a plan to use welfare-to-work funds to create jobs and training programs to help place people on welfare in living wage jobs within growth industries.

Not only has the Met Alliance been successful, it is widely seen as an important and successful coalition. Interviewees were strikingly uniform in their reasons for believing the Met Alliance to be a success and in identifying the elements that produced them:
The Alliance marries theory and practice: it has an internal research capacity coupled with an on-the-ground organizing capacity, which gives it credibility; it has a power analysis, generating or accessing data to support the analysis, which it then translates into concrete actions; it has buy-in from those affected by the analysis/impacted by the problems and has built meaningful relationships between Blacks and Latinos; it is dynamic in its campaigns, which has produced results; it has a mature, sharp, astute, long-term leadership that has a vision; it has historic relationships that helps diverse communities work together and share a common vision and power; it conducts great trainings of membership, building their capacity for policy reform work.

The fact that the leadership of the various organizational members have had trusting relationships for years and share a common ideology, particularly around the importance of multiracial coalition building, appears to be a significant factor in the Met Alliance’s success.

It appears relevant that Alliance leaders have had support for building their relationships through the Liberty Hill Foundation. Liberty Hill has proactively provided financial support for organic coalition work with Alliance members, including support for various forms of organizational interaction and learning. Through its community funding boards, Liberty Hill has brought leaders together, encouraged them to examine policy reform work and brings Alliance members together to determine the allocation of funding for the work. Liberty Hill has also provided media training to grantees.

A three year Ford Foundation grant enabled Liberty Hill to provide technical assistance which has included sessions on the history of social movements with a Los Angeles lens, quarterly breakfast meetings and peer support roundtables of senior and junior executive directors of grantee organizations and development director roundtables.

The Met Alliance has challenges to face as well. Most interviewees agreed that the Alliance had to include more Asians. There are two Korean organizations which are current members of the Met Alliance, but there has been much less inclusion of Asians generally. Geography explains some of the difficulty because of the geographic and spatial concentrations of the Asian communities in Los Angeles. The Chinese tend to be in Alhambra, Monterey Park and other eastern sections of the City. The Japanese reside primarily in East LA and downtown and Filipinos are spread out. The Hmong, Vietnamese and Cambodians are in the southern part of the County and in Orange County.

Another challenge is that the Met Alliance focuses its work on public programs. Pritchard thought that Asians have a greater reliance on family and community structures for support means, which tends to make them unlikely to demand public support and funding. Much of the Alliance advocacy focuses on government spending. The Asian group most represented in the coalition is Korean, through Korean Immigrant Workers
Advocates and the Korean Resource Center, because these organizations exist and share the strategic focus of accessing public benefits more equitably.

The Met Alliance also faces the challenge of identifying ways to address structural barriers unique to undocumented immigrant status within the coalition by determining clear long-term impacts of the job training strategies it is employing.

In sum, the Met Alliances keys to success include:

- Leadership relationships with a shared vision of building trusting multi-racial/ethnic coalitions,
- The ability to research issues within poor communities of color, and to use the information for strategic policy reforms,
- Its grassroots organizing methodology coupled with an inter-organizational strategy,
- Its strategic use of both inside (negotiation) and outside (protest) activities to win demanded reforms.
- Its internal structure and decision-making process including the coalition staff and a membership-based steering committee that engages in group strategy development and decision-making.
- The diversity of the staff and the steering committee and its willingness and ability to confront tensions directly.

Even well established coalitions are not static in terms of membership and the level of participation. The Met Alliance is no different. Organizations come and go or are more or less active depending on the nature of a particular campaign and its perceived relevance to the groups’ agendas. This fact, however, has not impacted the longevity or effectiveness of the Met Alliance as it continues to refresh its leadership and keep communities involved even as their roles or the degree of their activity may change.

C. CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR QUALITY SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS

1. Structural context and community relations history

Mississippi epitomizes racialized poverty. According to the 2000 Census, 36.3% of the population is African American. Yet, 44.1% of all African American children in Mississippi live below the federal poverty level, compared to 12.4% of white children in Mississippi. Census figures from 1990 found the Black unemployment rate to be almost 16%, while White unemployment rate was just over 5%. Census figures from

171 2000 U.S. Census
2000 show a difference in unemployment rates of 2.8% for whites and 7.3% for blacks.\(^{172}\)
Not only are Blacks less likely to be employed in Mississippi, their incomes are significantly lower than that of whites. Black per capita income in 2000 was $10,042, while white per capita income was $19,387. Black per capita income was the lowest of all racial groups in the state. Latino per capita income was $12,549 and American Indian per capita income was $11,726. Asians had the second highest per capita income level in the state at $17,504.\(^{173}\)

Racialized poverty is not just a condition; it is a structural arrangement born of the institutionalization of racism. In Mississippi, this institutionalization has taken many forms: post Civil War labor controls that kept African American farm laborers in debt and working on farms; racial discrimination in mill work hiring; withholding of federal subsidies to African Americans during the New Deal; and intentional segregation. The structural nature of racialized poverty is particularly reinforced by and pronounced in public education.

a. The Mississippi Delta Region

According to 2000 census data, slightly more than half the population of Mississippi is located in rural areas.\(^{174}\) Its poverty is, in part, due to its long tradition of the myth of individual achievement, the perpetuation of a reliance on very low-paid, marginalized labor, and the State’s failure to create meaningful and effective economic growth planning. In Mississippi only 12% of Delta residents have a bachelors degree and only 18% have some college experience. Almost 60% of African Americans over 25 years of age have less than a high school diploma, compared to just over 20% of Whites.\(^{175}\) Educational attainment impacts earnings. A college degree has been shown to increase African American incomes by 127% compared to incomes of African Americans with only a high school diploma and by 86% compared to Whites with a high school diploma. African Americans with a high school diploma earn $11,328 per year on average. African Americans with a college degree earn $25,663 per year on average.\(^{176}\) Of course, a college degree does not eliminate racial discrimination. In Mississippi, Whites with college degrees earn substantially more than African Americans with college degrees -- $34,439 and $21,540, respectively. This is the largest pay difference by race of college graduates in the nation.\(^{177}\)

Mississippi has also undergone some important demographic shifts over the past decade. The counties of the Mississippi Delta region have always been majority African American, thanks to the history of slavery, employment discrimination and other factors. But between 1990 and 2000, the African American population in the Delta has grown.

\(^{172}\) 1990, 2000 Census
\(^{173}\) 2000 U.S. Census, Geolytics.
\(^{174}\) 2000 U.S. Census
\(^{175}\) Invented Here; Toward an Innovation Driven Economy, a project of the Southern Technology Council/Southern Growth Policies Board (June 2000) at MS2.
\(^{177}\) Id.
7.3% -- significantly more than the White population in the Delta (2.9%). Researchers expect this trend to continue.

At the same time, the employment patterns in the region have been following national trends. Goods production jobs (farm, agricultural services, mining, manufacturing and construction) have declined while service production jobs (transportation, public utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, government and government enterprises) have increased. This shift results in lower paying jobs. While the number of African Americans living below the federal poverty level has decreased in recent years, this only takes income into account in defining poverty; not asset accumulation. Poverty cannot be accurately measured by income alone. Asset accumulation is an important component to financial security. In 1998, 25.5% of all American households had insufficient net worth to sustain living at the federal poverty level for three months if they stopped receiving their paychecks. Few of these Americans -- less than 13% of households -- were identified as poor in 1998. In the South, the number is probably higher, particularly for African Americans. Mississippi ranks 45th in the nation for mean net worth (including savings, investments, home ownership, etc.).

b. Education

Mississippi’s educational system was created with the intent of controlling African Americans and attempting to preserve their economic, political and social subservience to Whites. Its history is replete with examples of intentional policies to maintain White racial privilege over African Americans.

During slavery, the South’s White elites opposed compulsory public education. But, after the Civil War, public education became an explicit mechanism for White elites to rebuild and strengthen the Southern post-war economy, while preserving the racial hierarchy. After all, poor whites, who had also been denied access to an education during slavery, could not be left with fewer privileges than newly freed slaves.

Because education had to be segregated to ensure African American subordination, antebellum Mississippi created a fragmented, decentralized school system with nearly 4000 school districts. This necessarily resulted in gross underfunding of public education throughout the state, but particularly for African American communities. School district boundaries have not changed significantly from the times

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178 Beaulieu, *A Profile of the Mid-South Mississippi Delta Region*, Southern Rural Development Center, Mississippi State University (March 2002). The non-delta African American population has grown more rapidly -- 13.5% -- during the same period. The same is true for growth in the white non-Delta population -- 5.1%. *Id.*


of Jim Crow when the state reorganized the districts into 151, very near the 152 districts that exist today.

When the northern “progressive” movement pushed for education reform it explicitly intended to improve and standardize education for African Americans, as well as whites. In the South, however, progressivism was twisted into a mechanism to teach African Americans their place in the segregated South. The curriculum African Americans received was intended to prepare them for menial and subservient jobs, to teach them to properly respect whites and the government, and to make them less dangerous.  

The White power elite of Mississippi was so committed to racial segregation that in response to the Supreme Court’s seminal 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, the Mississippi State Legislature passed a constitutional amendment authorizing abolition of the public education system, if necessary, to preserve the practice of segregation. In addition, the legislature repealed the compulsory school attendance law. It did not re-instate the law until 1987.

Schools continue to be shaped by these intentionally segregative policies and the structures they created for the state’s school system. Examining year 2000 school district data from the Mississippi Department of Education, the Center for Social Inclusion found that school districts are racially segregated. The majority of districts (82 of 152) had a majority of African American students, with a statewide school district average of 56% African American students. Districts with high concentrations of African American students were associated with high concentrations of poverty. More than 80% of the Mississippi Delta school districts had above average concentrations of African American students and above average student eligibility for the free lunch programs.

Public schools are failing children in Mississippi, particularly for African American children. According to the Mississippi State Department of Education, the average graduation rate in Mississippi school districts was 80.5% for the year 2002-2003, but this varies greatly across districts, and the Delta has lower graduation rates.

The system of education financing has played a significant role in perpetuating poor educational outcomes for Mississippians. In the 1920s, the NAACP conducted studies of school expenditures for White and African American students in several southern states and found that the ratio in Mississippi was five to one. Financing

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183 Miss. Const. art. VIII, 213-B (1954) (state constitution amended to permit Legislature to abolish all public schools in state.
185 Center for Social Inclusion, Education Equity in Mississippi (Aug. 2003).
remained largely a responsibility for localities up until the late 1980’s and 1990’s. In 1953, the state legislature established the Minimum Education Program, which created a formula for education funding at the district level.\(^{188}\) Because this formula relied largely on local resources, it institutionalized longstanding education inequities. This remained the tool for allocating education funds for more than forty years.

Equity in education has been a relatively recent focus of school reform activities in Mississippi. In 1982, the state instituted its first major comprehensive school reform legislation which included increased funding at the state level (from sales, use, corporate, and individual income taxes) for financing public education and increased teachers salaries.\(^{189}\)

The Mississippi Adequate Education Act of 1994\(^ {190}\) not only legislated an increase in education spending, but also changed the way state funds are allocated to districts, mandating appropriate pupil-based funding designed to provide schools with monies consistent with the costs of operating at an “adequate education level.” The Mississippi State Legislature did not make appropriations for the implementation of this bill until 1997, and then it only partially funded it. Full funding of the Mississippi Adequate Education Program was approved early in 2003 for implementation in the upcoming school year.

In addition to segregation and financing disparities, there are several current educational dynamics that impact student achievement in Mississippi today. Inside local communities school boards, school administrators and teachers ignore the law and create environments of fear and terror inside of their schools. Abuse of disciplinary rules, which result in the suspension and/or expulsion of African-American students from school for minor infractions, is prevalent.

In a particularly egregious example, students on a school bus were playfully throwing peanuts at one another. A peanut accidentally hit the bus driver, who immediately pulled over and called the police. Police arrived, directed the bus full of students to follow them to the courthouse. After questioning all the students on the bus, five 17 and 18 year old African American boys were charged with felony assault, which carries a five year maximum prison term. Community and legal pressure resulted in the release of the youth and ultimately the charges were dropped. But they lost school bus transportation privileges, which meant that they could not get to the school thirty miles from their homes. They subsequently dropped out.\(^ {191}\)

Some children have behavioral problems and, therefore, may be harshly disciplined by school authorities in violation of federal law. These students may have attention deficit or hyperactivity disorders. They may lack emotional control due to a

\(^{188}\) Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-26  
^{189}\) MS ST § 37-1-1 (1982)  
\(^{191}\) The Advancement Project and the Civil Rights Project, Harvard University, *Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School Discipline* at 2 (June 2000).
disability or have other mental health issues. Under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), school authorities and other state actors are legally required to screen, identify and provide special educational planning for students with disabilities.\footnote{192} Not surprisingly most studies examining characteristics of juvenile detainees find a strong co-incidence of mental health disorders.\footnote{193}

In addition to school-based disciplinary abuse, police personnel and the juvenile justice system participate in the problem by failing to recognize and respond appropriately to minor disciplinary infractions. Police willingly do the bidding of school administrators who call them in to handle internal disciplinary problems and rules violations. Corporal punishment is also still legal in Mississippi schools. This may result in the over-representation of Black youth in the criminal justice system.

It is not surprising that in Mississippi, African American youth are over-represented in the juvenile justice system. For example, in 1997, minority youth accounted for 70% of commitments to public facilities and 62% of secure detention placements. In 1998, minority youth represented 23% of arrests, but 70% of transfers to adult court.\footnote{194}

It is also not surprising that disparities in educational opportunity continue into the state college and university system, particularly funding disparities between traditionally African-American and traditionally White state funded colleges and universities. On average, historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) receive 40% of their revenue from the state. In Mississippi, HBCUs receive only 28% of their revenue from the state. Predominantly White colleges and universities in Mississippi receive 38% of their revenues from the state.\footnote{195} Mississippi appropriates more dollars per student in predominantly White colleges and universities than in HBCUs -- $3143 compared to $2618.\footnote{196} Despite such funding disparities between HBCUs and predominantly White colleges and universities in Mississippi and the finding that Mississippi maintained segregated state colleges and universities (based upon mission

\footnote{192} Rich Campbell, \textit{Our Views: Congress Must Fulfill Promise to Special Education}, HATTIESBURG AMERICAN 9, AUG. 19, 2002.
\footnote{194} Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1999) and Minnesota's Three-Year Comprehensive Plan. 2000-2002. Department of Economic Security. (Data for secure juvenile detention facilities and secure juvenile correctional facilities not available). Under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), disproportionate minority confinement (DMC) exists when the proportion of youths detained or confined in secure detention facilities, secure correctional facilities, jails and lockups who are members of minority groups exceed their groups' proportions in the general population.
\footnote{196} Id. at 103.
designations, admissions requirements and duplication of programs), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to order additional funding to upgrade HBCUs.\textsuperscript{197}

2. History of the coalition, its structure and work

The Concerned Citizens for Children with Special Needs in Education (CCQSEP) is an informal coalition of state-wide organizations, including the Coalition for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD), Parents United Together (PUT), ARC, Living Independence for Everyone (LIFE), and community-based groups, including Citizens for Quality Education (CQE), based in Holmes County in the Mississippi Delta, and individuals. Southern Echo, a state wide training and advocacy organization, has not directly been a member organization of the coalition, but has had a staff member actively involved in the coalition in support of CQE.

CCQSEP appears to be something of a hybrid between a “multiracial issue-based coalition” and a “multiracial network.” It resembles the former in that it has focused on creating and altering public policy on treatment of children with special needs in the public education system. All the member organizations, however, also work together on a variety of policy issues related to public access and the quality of life of people with disabilities. They aggregate their organizational strengths and share information and resources in an ongoing fashion. This aspect of the coalitional relationship reflects more of a network model.

Its structure is informal. It has no staff or office. It is primarily a coalition of organizations, although some of the member organizations have individual members who participate in coalition meetings.

The traditional disability rights organizations (CCD, PUT, LIFE and ARC) had been working together for a long time on policy reform for people with disabilities. CCD’s membership and board has included African Americans with disabilities and their family members. A Shared interest in the quality of life of the disabled, however, is the impetus behind the multiracial nature of the CCD coalition. It has not analyzed the impact of race on the access to or needs of the African American community, nor has it engaged in any specific recruiting efforts to involve African Americans or other racial and ethnic minorities.

CQE, however, is the first African-American organization to be involved in coalitional work with the disability rights groups. Because CQE had become actively involved in special education issues, its staff and board members began appearing at meetings attended by the traditional disability rights community. Ellen Reddy, Vice-Executive Director of CQE, and Helen Johnson, a founder of CQE, Southern Echo staff member and member of the CQE Board of Directors, became better acquainted with key players in these organizations through their work on the failure of Delta schools to identify and respond appropriately to children with special needs. As a result, Mandy Rogers, the Director of PUT, approached CQE and asked them to attend the disability rights

\textsuperscript{197} United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992).
community’s legislative strategy meetings. In 2001, CQE became active in the policy reform discussions of the more predominantly white disability rights groups. The importance of CQE’s and the disability rights community’s collaboration was historic.

Holmes County, where CQE works, is over 75% African American and one of the poorest counties in the State of Mississippi. CQE was founded by residents in 1996 as an organizing project to work with youth. It started by creating a gardening project for youth who needed some activity. They used the gardening project to develop a youth-based environmental justice project. But they also became involved very quickly in education issues, because a participating child complained about abuse in school. CQE brought the youth together to talk about it and it became apparent that the particular teacher accused of abuse had abused other children. They protested as a group to the principal and pressured the principal to remove the teacher, who in the end resigned. This incident quickly took CQE into education issues, including discipline and proper instruction for children with special needs.

CQE is affiliated with Southern Echo, a state-wide training organization built by and for African American Mississippians in an effort to create and support strong community groups who effectively participate in state-wide, as well as local, policy reform on issues ranging from political participation, environmental justice and education reform. Southern Echo is not a membership-based organization. It works with groups that approach Southern Echo for training and advocacy assistance. Southern Echo has provided CQE with training and, in turn, CQE has become a leader in education issues in the State, working with Southern Echo and other Southern Echo affiliates. One of the ways in which Southern Echo supports its local community organizations is by placing community organizers on its staff, who focus their organizing on the communities. In the case of CQE, one of the founders and current co-chair of the CQE Board, Helen Johnson, is also a paid Southern Echo education organizer. Johnson has also been elected to the Holmes County School Board as a reform candidate. Leroy Johnson, the Director of Southern Echo, and a Holmes County resident, and Nsombi Lambright, the resource development director for Southern Echo, are also advisors to CQE.

Since 2000, CQE has had an office in Lexington, the largest town in Holmes County, and has had a half-time Executive Director, Ellen Reddy, a full-time administrative assistant and twelve students on stipends who do youth organizing. It is not currently a membership based organization, but it is working towards developing a formal membership. CQE, like Southern Echo, works on a multi-generational model. Therefore, the Board includes young people, including one of the co-Chairs. CQE trains youth in governance issues, which includes politics and policy issues, and maintains an environmental justice program. At the time of this study, youth were conducting surveys to collect data on corporal punishment in the schools.

Around issues of education, CQE has also developed the Parent Education Training and Support Program (PETS). This is a sophisticated training program with materials on negotiating the special education maze, knowing ones rights, critiquing student evaluation and individualized education plans and becoming aware of other
federal rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) rights. CQE has conducted PETS trainings for parents in Holmes County and plans to conduct them in other counties as well.

In addition, CQE has filed an administrative complaint with the State Department of Education for the Holmes County school district’s failure to comply with the IDEA assessment requirements. First CQE had filed its complaint with the Holmes County school district. It took the complaint to the State when the district failed to respond to the complaint. The State found IDEA violations, but according to one interviewee, it became clear to CQE that the State did not have the capacity to help the Holmes County school district come into IDEA compliance.

Additionally, in September 2000, CQE filed an accreditation complaint with the State calling for the raising of special education standards for accreditation. CQE was seeking an improvement plan that would spell out what the school district had to do to come into compliance. The capacity issues at the State Department of Education were so grave that during the negotiations, state personnel incorrectly argued that there were no state special education standards. Historically, the head of the state’s special education program had informed school districts to provide the absolute minimum for children because of the cost of such programs. Part of what CQE fought for was the naming of a division head who would be more accountable to parents.

CQE staff finally made progress on its demands while attending a national conference on special education held in New Orleans and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights division. CQE made several public statements during the conference in the presence of the Superintendent for the Mississippi Department of Education about the civil rights violations in Mississippi around special education. This brought higher level officials to the negotiating table and resulted in the hiring of a new special education division head, who corrected the subordinates who believed that there were no special education standards. The state also created a strategic planning body for the district to develop an improvement plan. Ellen Reddy serves on this body.

i. Mattie T. Consent Decree

At the time that CQE became involved in the policy reform meetings of the other disability rights groups, it specifically wanted to improve educational opportunities for African American children who were not getting a decent education. CQE believed that many children who were in disciplinary trouble in school were also special needs students whose emotional disabilities were not being identified and properly addressed. CQE initially attempted to influence the disability groups to become involved in disciplinary reform efforts. The disability rights groups did not see discipline as a primary issue of concern for their constituencies. CQE believed that disciplinary abuse was not exclusively a problem in the African American schools, which are still highly racially identifiable, but was a problem for students of all races (although it was possible that the disciplinary abuse was more prevalent in African American schools). Despite the
negative response from traditional disability rights groups, CQE’s staff continued to meet with them.

They began discussing the education-related needs of mentally and emotionally disabled children and agreed to identify ways to address these problems. The groups agreed to get the Children’s Defense Fund involved in securing compliance with a consent decree it had won back in the 1970s for IDEA compliance. The State Attorney General, Michael Moore, desired to get the state out from under all the long-standing civil rights consent decrees, which in addition to the school desegregation decrees, would include the IDEA consent decree.

In 1975 the Children’s Defense Fund filed a lawsuit against the State of Mississippi Department of Education (MDE), for failure to comply with the IDEA. Among other things, the IDEA requires states to create and carry out a “Child Find” program – a proactive program to locate and identify children with disabilities, including mental illness and emotional disorders, who may need accommodations to receive a public education. It also requires that children be tested using a racially and culturally unbiased test to determine whether they have any disabilities. Once a child is identified as a “special needs” child, the IDEA requires that she be placed in the least restrictive educational environment and provides various procedural safeguards for the child, including protections against discipline for behavior resulting from her disability. In 1977 the federal Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and the parties entered into a consent decree in 1979.

Since the 1979 consent decree, according to a coalition, the MDE has done nothing to comply with it. It did not appear that the Children’s Defense Fund had monitored the consent decree either. The groups called CDF and never heard back from the organization directly. However, CDF hired an attorney named James Gallaghan, a disability rights lawyer, to take a look at the case anew. Gallaghan needed the help of the coalition groups, to identify compliance problems.

Gallaghan also completed a compliance review. He found that as of the end of 1999, Mississippi’s numbers of children participating in IDEA programs fell shockingly far below national averages, and had the lowest child find rates in the country. While only circumstantial evidence, his compliance review created a strong indication of an almost complete lack of any IDEA programming. Mississippi reported 0 children identified as emotionally disturbed or with “other health impairments.” Gallaghan estimated that the number should be approximately 2000 students in Mississippi.

In response, CCQSEP organized a hearing at the State Capitol for November 1, 2001. It was held before the Senate Education Committee, headed by a sympathetic Senator, Alice Hardin, an African American representing Hinds County, in which Jackson, Mississippi is located, which is heavily African American. Alice Hardin was one of the Senators elected as a result of Southern Echo’s voting rights organizing in the

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early 1990s. CQE had over 200 people at the hearing, including parents and agency heads, to discuss the special education needs of children with disabilities. CQE had invited the Attorney General, who did not attend and instead moved to vacate the consent decree on that same day. On November 7, 2001, CQE held a similar hearing in the predominantly African American Delta region. It was a smaller hearing, but also attended by state legislators.

It was CQE’s intent to hold these hearings all over the state, but the Department of Education itself decided to do so. It held thirteen hearings around the state and asked the public to give it examples of what was working, as well as what was not working. According to Ellen Johnson, despite the State’s efforts to get good reports, most witnesses only told horror stories. Apparently, one of the highlights of the hearings was the one held at the University of Mississippi at Oxford. The University has a special education training program for student teachers and they had been placed in Delta schools for training. Young White student teachers told the Department of Education how African American children were not being taught, how they were warehoused in rooms watching television and being given the Sears catalogue to read. Based on these hearings, the Department could not deny that problems existed.

By January 2002, with Alice Hardin, CCQSEP met with the Attorney General to negotiate his position on vacating the consent decree, based on the information collected from the hearings and based on what they knew from their constituents. The Attorney General wanted the groups to bring his office winnable lawsuits on the special education issues. CCQSEP refused. The Attorney General, according to Ellen Johnson, called the Department of Education after the meeting to ask about the state of special education in the public schools. The Department, apparently admitted to him that there were many problems. This began formal negotiations over the consent decree.

There were many groups opposed to the renegotiation of the consent decree. District level program staff was opposed to it and the State Department of Education could not control them because they were not the State’s staff. They were hired at the school district level. Also the Association of School Superintendents opposed it. Their public opposition was based on the lack of resources to support the necessary programs.

3. Analysis

The fact that Black and White Mississippi parents came together through CCQSEP to work on a shared systemic education issue is significant and a success in its own right. Due to the multiracial nature of the CCQSEP campaign to force the state to comply with the IDEA, it has had a tremendous legislative and policy success. It not only saved a 30-year-old unenforced consent decree, it improved it. The state had three to five years to come into IDEA compliance under the revised consent decree. The State also had to create revised policies and procedures for IDEA compliance. CCQSEP had direct input into their development, which resulted in the creation of teacher support teams and other innovations. Also, Helen Johnson and other CCQSEP members now sit on the Mississippi Department of Education’s Special Education Advisory Committee.
The groups also became part of the federal Continuous Improvement Monitoring process, which includes Ellen Johnson and other coalition members on the review panel.

Furthermore, the coalition will continue beyond the consent decree monitoring and enforcement process, which will be an important task over the next five years. CQE has continued to participate in the legislative activities of the coalition and Helen Johnson has been nominated to the Chair of the Board of the Coalition for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD).

Ellen Reddy believes that CCQSEP has been successful because it involved both African American and white organizational participation, which is unprecedented in the state of Mississippi. Alice Hardin, as well as other legislators, has commented on the importance of the bi-racial nature of the coalition in moving legislators. Helen Johnson credits the legislative skills of CCD as contributing a vital asset to the legislative success of the CCQSEP. Mary Troupe, Executive Director of CCD, credits Ellen Reddy and Helen Johnson with significantly improving the work with their expertise on the workings of the Child Find program and in addressing the impact of the current policies on school children in the Delta region. The African American groups have greatly increased their own capacity on these issues and have also begun to influence the white organizations in terms of being willing to discuss discipline issues in schools.

One mistake Ellen Reddy believes CCQSEP made was its failure to fight for new appropriations to fund the special education programs under the consent decree. It would have been significantly harder to win the legislative battle if it were not cost neutral. Nonetheless, there was an eight million dollar pot of money available at the state level for districts to draw down for such programs, and because they had not been conducting assessments or initiating any programs, the money remained unused. It should be noted, however, that these funds would not be a sufficient amount of money to support IDEA compliance in every district in the State.

Unlike CAFE and the Met Alliance, CCQSEP has not addressed directly any issues of racial tension. The fight over the consent decree itself did not produce any specific tensions. However, tensions exist. Southern Echo and CQE, as well as other African American community groups working on education issues, have been particularly concerned about and interested in disciplinary abuse in schools generally. When CQE first became involved in the CCQSEP it attempted to press for the development of a coalitional response to disciplinary abuse, including zero tolerance policies and corporal punishment in the schools. Their coalition partners did not share their view that zero tolerance policies or corporal punishment were problematic and declined to address those issues. CQE hopes to continue to press these issues within the coalition based on the relationship it is building with the other member organizations and based on the new leadership role it appears Helen Johnson will play in CCD.

It is clear, however, that because both the disabled and African Americans are marginalized in the state of Mississippi, the groups saw an important shared strategic interest in working together and in continuing to do so, despite their ideological
differences and the lack of an effective process to address tensions. The longevity and continued success of the joint work may lay in working through these differences. Then again, it may not. It may be that there are sufficient shared interests between the groups and enough strategic advantage in working together that the coalitional work will continue for a long time to come. Whichever the case may be, the joint work CCQSEP has done to date is meaningful.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED/STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING MULTI-RACIAL WORK

It is evident from the case studies that there are many different coalitional forms chosen by participants based on the context, their analysis of the context and how they define the purpose and goals of coalitional work and perceive its costs and benefits. In the case of CAFE, because of the structural arrangements producing tensions between Latinos, African Americans and the Hasidim, the coalition had to be predicated on a year’s worth of work on Principles of Unity and the coalition was informal, but worked diligently on building trust and understanding across the groups. For the CCQSEP in Mississippi, however, where legislative reform in the area of education is a particularly difficult task, working through such relationship issues was relatively unimportant, at least given a well-defined policy reform task. But given a lack of shared ideology and the specific nature of the issue-based work, the coalition operates informally. Because the Met Alliance is not a single-issue coalition and has a long-term reform vision for low income communities of color across the City of Los Angeles, it employs a dual model of organizing individuals and organizations. It must have a staff dedicated to these tasks and a structure for decision-making across organizational and individual participants to accomplish its goals.

Structural tensions and the degree to which participants share an ideology also appear relevant to coalitional goals. In Williamsburg, Brooklyn, because the Latino and Hasidic community compete for affordable housing, and the Hasidim’s ideology requires self-segregation, housing was not an issue for joint work. Rather, it was a tension that had to be negotiated to do work the groups could agree upon based on shared interests. Because the Met Alliance is made up of ideologically like-minded groups, they are able to exist as a long-term coalition with a constantly developing agenda. They too, however, must confront and mediate tensions between groups.

It also appears that some contexts may make self-interest in joint work sufficiently clear that groups identify issues on which they can work together despite tensions and without the need to create internal structures for their confrontation, at least at the outset. The CCQSEP is an example of this.

All three coalitions required some degree of outside research resources to inform their policy reform work. The CAFE coalition and CCQSEP required the outside resources of legal organizations for strategic legal interventions, including data collection in the case of CCQSEP and to mediate conflict in the case of CAFE. Both CAFÉ and
CCQSEP also explicitly incorporated litigation into their policy reform strategies. CAFE and the UJO also required research support from NYPIRG. The Met Alliance is unique in its internal capacity for research, but it too has required outside research assistance, depending on the nature of the campaign. This suggests that successful coalitions are able to identify and martial outside resources to support their work in various ways, although the amount of resources needed depends on the internal capacity, structure and goals of the coalition.

All the coalitions were made up of groups with a constituency base. This meant that groups were not as insecure about being used to advance another group’s agenda, a cost some groups have identified in doing coalitional work. But meaningful constituency participation also provided the coalitions with credibility and power internally and externally to form the coalitions and win policy reform victories. Interestingly, each of the coalitions examined employed both “inside” and “outside” strategies to achieve their policy reform goals. All three used a combination of protest and negotiation to press for reforms. Protest was a viable tool and gave them leverage to negotiate with lawmakers, because they all had constituency bases from which to operate.

From an examination of the case studies, two factors appear to have been critical at the outset for the formation of each of the three multiracial coalitions: 1) a leader(s) with a vision for multiracial work and a strategic sense of how to foment it in light of the context within which the work is to occur; and 2) long-standing, respected institutions in communities of color with real constituencies. As the Mississippi case study shows, not all of the leaders in the coalition necessarily have to share a vision for multiracial collaboration, if the context does not demand it. If conditions for policy reform are sufficiently hostile, as in Mississippi, the pragmatic need to work together may support multiracial work despite the lack of a share vision for the work.

Based on the literature and these three case studies, there is support for considering additional factors as important for sustained and strategically effective multiracial coalitions:

1) a process for developing trust and understanding where tensions are particularly deep rooted and volatile (which might be developed through processes created by the coalition itself or which might predate the coalition’s formation);
2) some degree of shared ideology (which does not have to be complete ideological agreement, but should include some overlap of important ideological components to advance interest in long-term relationships);
3) effective explication of common interests to community participants (whether through trainings, public messaging); and
4) a strategic vision for structural reform, which can easily be and is articulated to the participating communities.

It is important to stress that, depending on the context of the coalitional work, it may not be necessary to have all of these components present at the inception of the work. It is evident from the case studies that coalitions are not static in form, goals or
vision. Some of these components might be developed over time. In the case of CAFE, it formed around a particular problem and the relationships that developed, as well as the strategic necessities arising during the incinerator fight, meant that the core organizational member groups created new alliances with different groups, sometimes only temporarily. Importantly, the core groups found additional work to do together after the incinerator battle. CCQSEP is also continuing to do work together, despite the policy victory on which it was premised. The result is the participation of African American community groups, which are multi-issue groups – working in a policy reform network with disability rights groups.

Conversely, some of these components may be absolutely necessary prerequisites to long-term effective work. Using the same example, CAFE’s longevity, while impressive given the context within which it has worked, may be stymied by the ideological differences of the core groups and the structural tensions, which reify these differences. The Met Alliance has existed for years and continues to be a strong coalition by virtue of its possession of all five identified components.

All three coalitions work on a shared or common interest framework. That is, they are all premised on the identification of shared policy reform interests, whether they are single-issue coalitions or long-term ideologically oriented coalitions. How these shared interests were identified and articulated is what differs across the case studies. The Met Alliance has developed relationships with organizations with a shared ideology on issues of race, poverty and public remedies that animate its evolving campaigns. CAFE, on the other hand, focused on environmental justice as a shared community interest which impacts everyone in the community despite ideological differences. The same can be said of the CCQSEP coalition.

Interestingly, all three coalitions have forces within the coalitions pressing the coalitions in new directions. How far they can be pushed may depend on the degree of ideological difference and the extent of the structural racism, which promote tensions. For example, the Met Alliance shares a philosophy, but the Latino community is pushing for greater inclusion of issues related to lack of citizenship. In CAFE, Latinos are pushing the Hasidim on the issue of housing and the resulting make-up of the neighborhood, and African Americans are pushing the disability rights community on the issue of school-based discipline. This reinforces the organic nature of coalitions and the importance of context on coalitional development. But it also demonstrates an important benefit to the coalitions themselves outside of their policy reform impact.

They serve a function in channeling a dialogue across member groups on important issues for multiracial work without regard to whether the coalition is in fact working on that issue. Therefore, there may be benefits to the work that are unrecognized when, or if, coalitions dissolve. New formations may be premised on the work of previous coalitions.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

For foundations, intermediary organizations and other entities seeking to create, support or strengthen existing multiracial work, the findings of this report suggest some direction.

To support the creation of multiracial coalitions it is important to do the following:

1. identify and support community leaders with a vision for multiracial work, its importance and who understand the context of the communities for which the coalition would work. These leaders must have credibility within their communities and be viewed by their communities as leaders.

2. support institutions created by and for constituent communities and run by community leaders. Across the three case studies, all strong coalitions included racially and ethnically identifiable constituent-based organizations with track records in their communities who operate to empower their constituencies, not just become gatekeepers and elite power-brokers. These democratic institutions with a philosophy of community empowerment appear to be critical for long-term and structural policy reform efforts between groups of color and groups of color and white groups.

For foundations, this support for visionary leaders and constituent organizations should include core support funding. Funding which enables leaders and organizations the flexibility to grow, develop and respond creatively to issues is key to their success and is often difficult to secure. The more common project-based funding often hampers the ability of a leader or community-based organization to respond appropriately to challenges and opportunities and may artificially force the work into narrow and short-term agendas, rather than allowing long-term and strategic development of reform initiatives. Also, technical support and capacity-building support should be coupled with grant-making. In some instances the technical support will be to develop the technological and research or data collection capacities of organizations. But it should also include opportunities for leaders of different communities to come together and develop relationships in the context of their work, without attempting to force them into a preconceived issue advocacy effort or coalition. The goal of relationship-building in and of itself is an important opportunity that is relatively unavailable to many community organizations and leaders.

Intermediary organizations and national or statewide advocacy groups should be cognizant of the need for community-based groups to develop their strategies with support, but without the fear of being hijacked by a particular agenda. Groups need research and data collection support that meets their advocacy needs, as well as which help them to develop strategic agendas.

Both foundations and organizations should not define coalitional success by the longevity of the coalition or by the establishment of a particular coalitional formation. While mobilizations on a specific issue are easy to support and understand as successful or unsuccessful at the end of an identifiable time period, this may not be effective for
long-term policy reform goals. Different contexts will provide different types of coalitional opportunities and structures. The goal should be the support of coalitions with the right ingredients for moving policy reform work forward in a way that will develop relationships and, therefore, coalitional work over time. Coalitions should not be viewed as static.

For foundations or other organizations seeking to support multiracial coalitions or other forms of multiracial collaborations, it is important to identify the structural racism producing tensions and the history of those structural relationships in order to locate the opportunities for and barriers to multiracial coalitional efforts. With that context in mind, organizations can more appropriately assess the type of support that might be needed and to more appropriately evaluate the nature of any existing multiracial work or the lack thereof.

Foundations and other organizations should provide support around data collection and other forms of research linked both to specific campaigns, but also linked to a more general understanding of structural racism and its impact on various communities. Without constituency education on structural racism as it impacts particular contexts, constituents may not support or participate in multiracial coalitions. The intent, however, of such research and constituency education should be the reduction of tensions. Rather, it should help groups understand what structural arrangements create the tensions and to help identify shared interests and common strategies.

This report also demonstrates a need to support both research and advocacy, including organizing that is focused on dismantling structural racism as such.

The sections of this report may be used as training tools for foundation staff and for target organizations and technical assistance providers:

1. The literature review helps locate current research and debates around what structural racism is, how it operates, and what the implications are for coalitional work. It can help create a baseline of knowledge for foundations or organizations seeking to make policy reform impacts.
2. Likewise, the case study sections can also be used as a discussion/training tool to identify different models of coalition building that have worked in different contexts. This may assist local leaders, technical assistance providers and foundation staff to identify a range of possible models.
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